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WHO WILL SAVE THE REDHEADS? TOWARDS AN
ANTI-BULLY THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW AND
PROTECTION OF DEMOCRACY
Yaniv Roznai*
Dedicated in memory of Israeli Supreme Court Justice Mishael
Cheshin, a brilliant jurist; bold protector of democracy and judi-
cial independence; and a redhead.
Democracy is in crisis throughout the world. And courts play a key role within
this process as a main target of populist leaders and in light of their ability to hinder
administrative, legal, and constitutional changes. Focusing on the ability of courts
to block constitutional changes, this Article analyzes the main tensions situated at
the heart of democratic erosion processes around the world: the conflict between
substantive and formal notions of democracy; a conflict between believers and non-
believers that courts can save democracy; and the tension between strategic and
legal considerations courts consider when they face pressure from political branches.
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Using comparative examples, the Article demonstrates how courts can indeed func-
tion as a useful stop sign or speed bump against attempts to erode the constitutional
order. Since a central feature of democratic erosion is court-capturing, -packing, or
-threatening, this Article builds on anti-bully theories to propose an “anti-bully
theory of judicial review,” which posits that the judiciary should neither go down
the bunker nor retaliate the confrontation but try, as much as possible, to act as though
everything is “business-as-usual.”
At its core, this Article argues that courts have an important role in protecting
democracy against constitutional reforms eroding the constitutional order and that
courts should stand firm against pressure so they can do their best to protect democ-
racy, even if they cannot save democracy on their own.
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INTRODUCTION
Constitutional democracies around the world are in a crisis.1 European countries
that were considered, until recently, stable democracies are facing “democratic back-
sliding,”2 and scholarly work has begun to explore whether the democracy in the
U.S. is in danger.3 The 2019 Freedom House Report, for example, indicates that 2018
1 See generally, e.g., CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY IN CRISIS? (Mark A. Graber,
Sanford Levinson & Mark Tushnet eds., 2018); STEVEN LEVITSKY &DANIEL ZIBLATT,HOW
DEMOCRACIES DIE (2018); DAVID RUNCIMAN, HOW DEMOCRACY ENDS (2018); YASCHA
MOUNK, THE PEOPLE VS. DEMOCRACY: WHY OUR FREEDOM IS IN DANGER AND HOW TO SAVE
IT (2018); WILLIAM A. GALSTON, ANTI-PLURALISM: THE POPULIST THREAT TO LIBERAL
DEMOCRACY (2018).
2 See generally, e.g., PAUL BLOKKER, NEW DEMOCRACIES IN CRISIS?: A COMPARATIVE
CONSTITUTIONAL STUDY OF THE CZECH REPUBLIC, HUNGARY, POLAND, ROMANIA AND
SLOVAKIA (2014); THE ENFORCEMENT OF EULAW AND VALUES:ENSURINGMEMBERSTATES’
COMPLIANCE (András Jakab & Dimitry Kochenov eds., 2017); ANDRÁSL.PAP,DEMOCRATIC
DECLINE IN HUNGARY: LAW AND SOCIETY IN AN ILLIBERAL DEMOCRACY (2018); WOJCIECH
SADURSKI, POLAND’S CONSTITUTIONAL BREAKDOWN (2019).
3 See generally, e.g., Robert Mickey, Steven Levitsky & Lucan Ahmad Way, Is America
Still Safe for Democracy?: Why the United States is in Danger of Backsliding, 96 FOREIGN
AFFS. 20 (2017).
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marked a serious crisis of democracy and recorded the thirteenth consecutive year of
decline in global freedom as sixty-eight countries suffered from decline in civil and
political rights.4 Democracy around the world is being eroded.5
Tom Ginsburg and Aziz Huq define democratic erosion “as a process of incremen-
tal, but ultimately still substantial, decay in the three basic predicates of democracy—
competitive elections, liberal rights to speech and association, and the rule of law.”6
They explain that “erosion does not typically result in full-blown authoritarianism.
Instead, its outcome is some form of competitive authoritarianism, in which elec-
tions of a sort occur, where liberal rights to speech and association are not wholly
stifled, and where there is some semblance of the rule of law.”7 As they demonstrate,
such processes are taking place in various countries, such as Hungary, Poland, and
Venezuela.8 This is the global context for this Article, though there is also a local
context as a case study. In recent years, Israel has witnessed a process of counter-
constitutional revolution in response to the liberal constitutional revolution in the
1990s.9 It is “in the midst of an intentional legislative and political process which aims
to weaken and circumvent democratic checks and balances and liberal-democratic
principles.”10 There are, among other developments described lengthily elsewhere,
manifold attempts to reform the judiciary, such as: (1) proposals to limit the court’s
authority to review administrative actions based on the “reasonableness” doctrine;
(2) proposals to limit standing before the court; (3) serious discussions on inserting
an “override clause” to Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty, which would allow
a majority of Knesset Members to enact legislation notwithstanding its unconstitu-
tionality; (4) proposals to change the way judges are appointed; and more.11 Although
many of the examples are from Israel, the argument that is drawn is applicable to
many—if not all—of the cases of democratic crises we are witnessing.
4 Freedom in the World 2019, FREEDOM HOUSE (2019), https://freedomhouse.org/sites
/default/files/Feb2019_FH_FITW_2019_Report_ForWeb-compressed.pdf [https://perma.cc
/5SEN-MD6L].
5 Various terms have recently been used to express this crisis: democratic “decay,”
“decline,” “erosion,” “retrogression,” “rot,” or “backsliding.” See generally Tom Gerald Daly,
Democratic Decay: Conceptualising an Emerging Research Field, 11 HAGUE J. ON RULE L.
9 (2019).
6 TOM GINSBURG & AZIZ Z. HUQ, HOW TO SAVE A CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY 43
(2018) (emphasis omitted).
7 Id. at 44.
8 Id. at 45–47.
9 See generally, e.g., Nadiv Mordechay & Yaniv Roznai, A Jewish and (Declining)
Democratic State? Constitutional Retrogression in Israel, 77 MD. L. REV. 244 (2017).
10 Gila Stopler, Constitutional Capture in Israel, INT’L J. CONST. L. BLOG (Aug. 21,
2017), http://www.iconnectblog.com/2017/08/constitutional-capture-israel [https://perma.cc
/QBN4-7CRN].
11 These processes are fully described in Mordechay & Roznai, supra note 9, at 253–54;
Yaniv Roznai, Israel: A Crisis of Liberal Democracy?, in CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY IN
CRISIS?, supra note 1, at 355, 363–64.
330 WILLIAM & MARY BILL OF RIGHTS JOURNAL [Vol. 29:327
Indeed, against the backdrop of this global and local context, this Article explores
the more general question: can courts protect democracy through judicial review?
It will focus especially on a particular type of judicial exercise—judicial review of
formal constitutional amendments by using the “unconstitutional constitutional
amendments doctrine,” a rising phenomenon in recent years.12
Throughout the discussion, this Article seeks to highlight and analyze three
central tensions concerning the relationship between courts and the protection of
democracy. In light of conflicting visions of democracy that reflect the basic tension
in the crisis of democracy—whether democracy is purely formal, as reflecting the
majority’s will, or whether there are substantive values which trump majoritarian
decision-making13—Part I asks what type of democracy are we to protect? Part II
demonstrates how judicial review of constitutional amendments may assist in pro-
tecting democracy. By so doing, it also exposes the false dichotomy of some of the
objections to judicial review, which argue that judicial review would be helpless in
protecting democracy against a corrupted society that no longer wishes to be a
democratic one. Additionally, it examines the anticipatory effect of judicial review
on constitutional amendments and its ability to protect democracy during the early
stage of the legislative process. Finally, since a central feature of democratic erosion
is court-capturing, -packing, or -threatening,14 Part III asks what courts should do
when they are under political pressure. Resembling scenarios of dealing with bullies,
it proposes an anti-bully theory of judicial review according to which the judiciary
should neither go down the bunker nor retaliate the confrontation but try, as much
as possible, to act “business-as-usual.”
I. WHAT TYPE OF DEMOCRACY ARE WE TO PROTECT?
In a 2014 public speech, the Hungarian Prime Minister, Victor Orbán, declared:
“[T]he new state that we are constructing in Hungary is an illiberal state, a non-liberal
state. It does not reject the fundamental principles of liberalism such as freedom . . .
but instead includes a different, special, national approach.”15 Thus, the transformation
from a liberal democracy to an illiberal state seems to have been an explicit goal of the
regime.16 This transformation, which has taken place in recent years, weakened checks
12 On the increasing trend of judicially reviewing constitutional norms, see generally YANIV
ROZNAI,UNCONSTITUTIONAL CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENTS: THE LIMITS OF AMENDMENT
POWERS (2017); KEMAL GÖZLER, JUDICIAL REVIEW OF CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENTS: A
COMPARATIVE STUDY (2008).
13 See AHARON BARAK, THE JUDGE IN A DEMOCRACY 23–26 (2009).
14 Tom Ginsburg, The Jurisprudence of Anti-Erosion, 66 DRAKE L.REV. 823, 829 (2018).
15 Viktor Orbán, Prime Minister, Speech at the 25th Bálványos Summer Free University
and Student Camp (July 26, 2014), http://www.kormany.hu/en/the-prime-minister/the-prime
-minister-s-speeches/prime-minister-viktor-orban-s-speech-at-the-25th-balvanyos-summer
-free-university-and-student-camp [https://perma.cc/B6FG-9DRG] (cached version).
16 On this transformation, see generally Gábor Halmai, An Illiberal Constitutional System
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and balances and rights protection and ultimately failed “to comply with minimum
standards of constitutionalism.”17 This challenge to a “liberal notion of democracy”
is not unique to Hungary. It appears that, in various countries, liberal or substantive
notions of democracy are under attack in the name of a purely procedural or majori-
tarian version of democracy, according to which the political majority represents the
sovereign and is thus omnipotent.18
A somewhat similar approach is being expressed in Israel, where, according to
some political and public views, democracy is fulfilled through elections and decision-
making processes reflecting the majority’s will and nothing more.19 Perhaps the best
example is reflected in the approach of Israel’s former Minister of Justice, Ayelet
Shaked, who led various reforms to restrict courts’ authority and acted to appoint
“conservative” judges during her term.20 In response to claims that such reforms are
a threat to democracy, she claimed: “they declared [Israel’s democracy’s] death so
many times, that it seems that not only cats have nine lives, but also our democracy.”21
In her opinion, “Israeli democracy is as healthy as a bull,” and the processes that are
taking place fortify the notion that Israel’s democratic basis reflects the majority’s
will.22 Prior to the general elections that took place in early 2019, Minister Shaked
released a campaign video in which she posed in a mock advertisement for a perfume
labeled “Fascism.”23 The video is a reaction to those who have criticized—including
accusations of fascism—her attempts to restructure the Israeli judiciary.24 In the black
and white video, Shaked wanders around in slow motion, her hair blowing as soft
piano music plays in the background while she whispers her key policies: “judicial
in the Middle of Europe, 2014 EUR. Y.B. HUM. RTS. 497; Kriszta Kovács & Gábor Attila
Tóth, Hungary’s Constitutional Transformation, 7 EUR. CONST. L. REV. 183 (2011); Sonja
Priebus, Hungary, in CONSTITUTIONAL POLITICS IN CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE 101
(Anna Fruhstorfer & Michael Hein eds., 2016); Miklós Bánkuti, Gábor Halmai & Kim Lane
Scheppele, From Separation of Powers to a Government Without Checks: Hungary’s Old
and New Constitutions, in CONSTITUTION FOR A DISUNITED NATION: ON HUNGARY’S 2011
FUNDAMENTAL LAW 237 (Gábor Attila Tóth ed., 2012).
17 Renáta Uitz, Can You Tell When an Illiberal Democracy Is in the Making?: An Appeal to
Comparative Constitutional Scholarship from Hungary, 13 INT’L J. CONST. L. 279, 281 (2015).
18 On the concept of illiberal democracy, see generally Fareed Zakaria, The Rise of
Illiberal Democracy, 76 FOREIGN AFFS. 22 (1997).
19 See, e.g., Roznai, supra note 11, at 359–60, 362–63, 366.
20 Oliver Holmes, Far-Right Israeli Campaign Ad Jokes of “Fascism” Perfume, GUARDIAN
(Mar. 19, 2019, 6:30 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/mar/19/far-right-israeli
-campaign-ad-jokes-of-fascism-perfume-ayelet-shaked [https://perma.cc/KS2P-U9AT].
21 Roznai, supra note 11, at 370 (discussing comments from former Minister Shaked,
which are located in Itamar Levin, Naor Against Shaked: It Is Forbidden to Examine the
Positions of a Judge, NEWS1 (Dec. 1, 2016), https://www.news1.co.il/Archive/001-D-385
614-00.html [https://perma.cc/L6X3-44HY] (in Hebrew)).
22 Id.
23 Holmes, supra note 20.
24 Id.
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revolution,” “scaling back judicial activism,” “judicial appointments,” “governance,”
“separation of powers,” and “restraining the High Court of Justice.”25 Spritzing,
holding a perfume labeled “Fascism,” she then turns to the camera, suggesting, “the
bottle has been mislabeled: ‘To me, it smells like democracy.’”26 While this is meant
to be a “humoristic” video, it cogently reflects the notion that granting more power
to the political branches while limiting the judiciary is a fulfilment of democracy.
Such a notion focuses on the formal or procedural aspects of democracy. It con-
siders democracy as purely procedural, i.e., simply as a system of self-governance
in which citizens can make majority, collective decisions. But surely democracy, as
a system of government, does not end with majoritarian rule-making. Democracy
cannot be reduced to two wolves and a lamb voting on what to have for lunch. It
must mean more than that. Democracy is more than just majoritarianism. It in-
cludes—and must include—the protection of certain basic rights and basic princi-
ples.27 Democracy includes substantive preconditions for its realization.28 As Frank
Michelman writes:
Maybe everyone agrees that democracy connotes a procedure of
joint decision by many persons somehow acting together. But no
less essentially, it connotes a socially constituted relationship
among parties to the procedure. You will not, I hope, regard a
political procedure as democratic . . . unless participants enter
the procedure in the appropriate relations of equality, independ-
ence, freedom, and security, vis-à-vis one another and vis-à-vis
the political collective and its powers.29
Even if one focuses on the narrowest character of formal democracy, elections, this
must include substantive values.30 There is no formal democracy without substantive
values.31 True, majority is the basis for democracy. But for majority decision-
making to exist (and for the simplicity of the discussion assume the need to have
genuine and fair elections), other values must exist, at least to a certain degree:
freedom of speech, freedom of association, equality, rule of law, and separation of
25 Jonathan Caras, Ayelet Shaked—Fascism—English Subtitles, YOUTUBE (Mar. 19, 2019),
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=P0peSwxSEqY [https://youtu.be/P0peSwxSEqY].
26 Holmes, supra note 20; Caras, supra note 25.
27 See, e.g., BARAK, supra note13, at 24 (“The most important of these values are separation
of powers, the rule of law, judicial independence, human rights, and basic principles that
reflect yet other values (such as morality and justice), social objectives (such as public peace
and security), and appropriate ways of behavior (reasonableness, good faith).”).
28 See, e.g., id. at 23–24; RONALD DWORKIN, A BILL OF RIGHTS FOR BRITAIN 35 (1990).
29 Frank I. Michelman, Brennan and Democracy, 86 CALIF. L. REV. 399, 419 (1998).
30 BARAK, supra note 13, at 24–26.
31 Id. at 24.
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powers.32 The former principles are essential for a genuine democracy, and the latter
are crucial for making sure there are no actions to undermine or defraud the system
of competitive elections.33
A majoritarian decision of five to eliminate the minority of four in a “fair” and
“equal” vote, in order to ensure that, in future elections, the majority’s chances of
winning the elections would be guaranteed, is not a democratic decision.34 The
disagreement, whenever it exists, is which and to what extent substantive values are
necessarily included in democracy.35 Thus, there is no such thing as a purely “formal
democracy.” A genuine democracy requires substance.36 Likewise, there is no such
thing as an “illiberal democracy”; democracy must be liberal.37 Of course, there is
a spectrum of liberalism to which democracy adheres. A democracy can be more or
less liberal. But below a certain threshold, there is no such thing as an illiberal
democracy—it is simply not a democracy.38 As Del Dickson puts bluntly:
Illiberal democracy is not so much a liberal democracy gone bad
as an illusory democracy; an authoritarian regime with symbolic
trappings of democracy, but without the substance. It has pseudo-
liberal architecture and institutions, but lacks the underlying
commitment to core liberal ideas such as limited and accountable
government and the rule of law. It lacks the rules, procedures,
practices, and habits that make democracy come to life.39
In that respect, Jan-Werner Müller is correct to claim that “[t]he fact that Europe’s new
authoritarians have come to power through free and fair elections” does not mean that
their attempts to transform the political system are democratically legitimate.40 “Instead
32 Id. at 145–46.
33 Id.
34 See BARAK, supra note 13, at 25.
35 Id. at 23–26.
36 Id. at 24 (“[The rule of democratic values] is a substantive aspect of democracy. . . .
Without it, a regime is not democratic.”).
37 For a counter-classification of varieties of democracy, see ALBERTWEALE, DEMOCRACY
19–39 (1999).
38 The question of what constitutes that minimal core of democracy is, of course, a con-
tentious one. For an attempt at answering it, see Rosalind Dixon & David Landau, Competitive
Democracy and the Constitutional Minimum Core, in ASSESSING CONSTITUTIONAL PER-
FORMANCE 268, 269 (Tom Ginsburg & Aziz Huq eds., 2016) (“We define the minimum core
of a democratic constitutional order as the set of institutions, procedures, and individual
rights that are necessary to maintain a system of multiparty competitive democracy.”).
39 DEL DICKSON, THE PEOPLE’S GOVERNMENT: AN INTRODUCTION TO DEMOCRACY 25
(2014).
40 Jan-Werner Müller, The Problem with “Illiberal Democracy,” SOC. EUR. (Jan. 27,
2016), https://www.socialeurope.eu/the-problem-with-illiberal-democracy [https://perma.cc
/D9XA-8PTT].
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of describing them as ‘illiberal,’” he claims, “we should be calling them what they
really are: ‘undemocratic.’”41
After understanding what kind of democracy is to be protected, the question
remains, can courts fulfill this function?
II. WHO WILL SAVE THE REDHEADS?
A. The False Dichotomy of Democratic Failure
Assuming one understands the minimum substantive core of democracy that
ought to be protected, one basic question regarding judicial review and the protec-
tion of democracy concerns the actual ability of courts to function as guardians of
the democratic order. In other words, the question is: can courts deliver?
Before delving into this question, an explanation must be in place for what is
meant by protecting democracy. After establishing, in the previous section, that democ-
racy includes the formal, fair, and equal-majoritarian process of decision-making,
in addition to substantive principles such as freedom of expression, freedom of asso-
ciation, equality, separation of powers, and rule of law,42 it is easier to divide the
role of protection of democracy into its four main priorities:
First, is the protection of the democratic process itself, i.e., making sure that the
narrow competitive electoral and majoritarian processes in a democracy are main-
tained as genuine, fair, and equal.43 Here, the courts have a crucial role to play. This
is because elected politicians—unlike judges—lack the necessary incentives to maintain
democratic competition.44 For example, a recent case from the Republic of Malawi,
which concerned an election dispute, successfully brought a repeat election in which
an opposing politician defeated an incumbent and thus resulted in governmental turn-
over.45 This and other examples from Africa brought commentators to argue “that
judicializing presidential election disputes may under certain circumstances constitute
41 Id.
42 See supra Part I; see also BARAK, supra note 13, at 23–26.
43 Compare this notion with Ely’s theory of judicial review, according to which judicial
review should focus on the political process and should ensure equal representation. This
theory maintains that courts should intervene when the political process fails, either when
powerholders obstruct it to preserve the status quo or when the government denies minorities
the same protection it grants to the majority. See John Hart Ely, Toward a Representation-
Reinforcing Mode of Judicial Review, 37 MD. L. REV. 451, 453 (1978). See generally JOHN
HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW (1980).
44 Aziz Z. Huq & Tom Ginsburg, Democracy Without Democrats, 6 CONST. STUD. 165,
167 (2020).
45 Mutharika v. Chilima [2020] MWSC 1, 69 (Malawi), https://malawilii.org/mw/judgment
/supreme-court-appeal/2020/1 [https://perma.cc/E5GG-T9YN]; Hamza Mohamed, After Historic
Election, What Next for Malawi?, AL JAZEERA (June 28, 2020), https://www.aljazeera.com
/news/2020/6/28/after-historic-election-what-next-for-malawi [https://perma.cc/VW6V-TFYH].
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a safeguard protecting the integrity of elections that incumbents rig in their favor.”46
Such cases are important for protecting the possibility of rotation, which is essential
for guaranteeing democracy and the rule of law.47
Second, is the protection of individual rights and, in particular, minority rights
against the tyranny of the majority.48
Third, is the protection of the separation of powers and making sure that one
branch does not overstep its mandate and trespass into another’s authority.49 An exam-
ple of the role of the court as the guardian of separation of powers can be found when
courts invalidate a decision of the executive that undermines the authority of the
legislature. A recent illustration would be the Cherry/Miller (No. 2) case by the UK
Supreme Court.50 In this case, the Supreme Court was called to determine whether the
advice of the Prime Minister to the Queen regarding the prorogation of Parliament was
unlawful.51 The Supreme Court held that government’s advice to the Queen to
prorogue Parliament:
[W]ill be unlawful if the prorogation has the effect of frustrating
or preventing, without reasonable justification, the ability of
Parliament to carry out its constitutional functions as a legislature
46 Olabisi D. Akinkugbe & James T. Gathii, Judicial Nullification of Presidential Elections
in Africa: Peter Mutharika v. Lazarus Chakera and Saulos Chilima in Context, AFRONOMICS-
LAW (July 3, 2020), https://www.afronomicslaw.org/2020/07/03/judicial-nullification-of
-presidential-elections-in-africa-peter-mutharika-v-lazarus-chakera-and-saulos-chilima-in
-context/ [https://perma.cc/7FA4-ASE6].
47 Andras Jakab, What Can Constitutional Law Do Against the Erosion of Democracy
and the Rule of Law? On the Interconnectedness of the Protection of Democracy and the
Rule of Law, 6 CONST. STUD. 5, 23 (2020).
48 See RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 85 (1977). See generally Minh
Tuan Dang, Constitutional Protection of Fundamental Rights: Comparative Analysis of the
American and European Model of Constitutional Review, in THE ROLE OF COURTS IN CON-
TEMPORARY LEGAL ORDERS 189 (Martin Belov ed., 2019). The question of whether judicial
review is essential for protecting rights is a complex one. Rights can surely be secured by
legislatures as well. See generally, e.g., GRÉGOIRE WEBBER ET AL., LEGISLATED RIGHTS:
SECURING HUMAN RIGHTS THROUGH LEGISLATION (2018). Nevertheless, courts clearly play
a significant role in rights protection. For an analysis, see generally Terrance Sandalow,
Judicial Protection of Minorities, 75 MICH. L. REV. 1162 (1977); Wojciech Sadurski, Judicial
Review and the Protection of Constitutional Rights, 22 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 275 (2002).
For a recent argument that courts’ ability to enforce constitutional rights is more limited than
is commonly believed, see generally Adam S. Chilton & Mila Versteeg, Courts’ Limited Ability
to Protect Constitutional Rights, 85 U. CHI. L. REV. 293 (2018).
49 See Yaniv Roznai, Constitutional Paternalism: The Israeli Supreme Court as Guardian
of the Knesset, 51 VERFASSUNG UND RECHT IN ÜBERSEE 415, 422–23 (2018).
50 R v. Prime Minister [2019] UKSC 41 (appeal taken from Eng.), https://www.supreme
court.uk/cases/docs/uksc-2019-0192-judgment.pdf?fbclid=IwAR3cTBCSGvPP7ByGQ7L
_5FZBpmWKY1FSaQmPWB9TE17ZtOsvJLG5y3QReIQ [https://perma.cc/NB6M-YC4V].
51 Id. at [1].
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and as the body responsible for the supervision of the executive.
In such a situation, the court will intervene if the effect is suffi-
ciently serious to justify such an exceptional course.52
In such a case, the court protected the principle of separation of powers.53
Fourth, is the protection of the very foundational principles of the constitution, for
example by enforcing constitutional unamendability through judicial review of constitu-
tional amendments.54 To be clear, upholding democracy is a key and legitimate part of
the judicial role.55 Importantly, courts—especially in a dysfunctional democratic insti-
tutional environment—often work to improve the performance of political institutions
and to make democratic institutions work better.56 What this Article describes is a
rather minimalist judicial role of protecting democracy, not improving or building it.57
52 Id. at [50]. On the ability of this test to bolster the judicial protection of democracy, see
Tarun Khaitan, The Supreme Court Ruling: Why the Effects Test Could Help Save Democracy
(Somewhat), LONDONSCH.ECON. (Sept. 24, 2019), https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/brexit/2019/09/24/the
-supreme-court-ruling-why-the-effects-test-could-help-save-democracy-somewhat/ [https://
perma.cc/C2QH-S2WT]. Khaitan explains:
The Miller2/Cherry test, expressed more broadly and less deferentially
below, is a brand new and sophisticated ammunition in the rapidly age-
ing arsenal of democracy defenders:
“Governmental action that has the effect of frustrating, preventing,
or substantially undermining the ability of constitutional actors to
discharge their constitutional powers, duties, or functions shall be unlaw-
ful, unless the government can show that such action was a proportionate
means of achieving a legitimate objective.”
This test will not be a panacea. And courts alone cannot save democ-
racy either, even if they remain competent, constitutionally literate, and
independent. But as far as the judiciary’s constitutional watchdog role
goes, this is as good as a judicial intervention is likely to get.
53 R, [2019] UKSC at [34] (“Indeed, by ensuring that the Government does not use the
power of prorogation unlawfully with the effect of preventing Parliament from carrying out
its proper functions, the court will be giving effect to the separation of powers.”). For some
recent examples from Israel, where the Supreme Court acted as guardian of the Knesset
against the rising power of the executive, see Roznai, supra note 49, at 422–23.
54 See ROZNAI, supra note 12, at 183–225.
55 Luis Roberto Barroso, Countermajoritarian, Representative, and Enlightened: The
Roles of Constitutional Courts in Democracies, 67 AM. J. COMPAR. L. 109, 142 (2019).
56 For evidence of such a role of courts, mainly in the “Global South,” see generally
David Landau, A Dynamic Theory of Judicial Role, 55 B.C. L. REV. 1501 (2014).
57 David Prendergast, The Judicial Role in Protecting Democracy from Populism, 20
GERMAN L.J.245, 246 (2019) (“In addressing the populist challenge, courts can, in principle,
try to be a few steps ahead in anticipating and, where they can, slowing democratic degrada-
tion.”); id. at 247 (“[I]t is consistent with democratic theory for judges to be constitutionally
empowered to intervene to prevent democratic degradation; this function may help guard
against the dangers of populism, and it should be performed in a restrained manner, which
is styled as protecting—not perfecting—democracy.”).
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In that respect, this Article accepts Sethi’s approach according to which the court’s
“most vital” role is “democratic protectionism”; “‘protecting a democracy from
eroding’ . . . is what constitutional courts should devote the bulk of their institutional
capital towards.”58
The claim that courts can actually function as protectors of democracy has been
under criticism by various politicians and public thinkers, who argue that the court
should not be empowered to review constitutional laws or who claim that restricting
and limiting the authority of courts to conduct judicial review is not such an adverse
process because, in any event, courts cannot protect democracy against destruction.
So, the argument goes, because the power of the courts is limited anyways, there is
no problem in limiting a court’s authority further.
Again, Israel is an example. In early 2019, Chief Justice of the Israeli Supreme
Court Esther Hayut stated in a speech in Nuremberg, Germany that:
One of the universal lessons we should learn from the histor-
ical events . . . is that judicial independence, on the institutional and
personal level, is one of the most important guarantees that the
individual has an address to turn to to protect their rights . . . . The
safeguarding of that principle and judges’ independence is there-
fore one of the cornerstones of every democratic regime . . . .59
In response, Yair Netanyahu, the son of Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, tweeted:
“Fact check: in Germany before the rise of the Nazis, the court had the authority to
invalidate laws!”60
Historically speaking, the courts did not stop the Nazis’ rise to power and per-
haps were even helpful to such a rise.61 Of course, judicial review under the Weimar
58 Amal Sethi, Towards a Pluralistic Conception of Judicial Role, 90 UMKC L. REV.
(forthcoming 2021) (manuscript at 4), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3545792 [https://perma.cc
/7U8H-S6HQ].
59 Michael Bachner, Supreme Court President Invokes Nazi Era in Implicit Swipe at
Netanyahu, TIMESISR. (May 14, 2019, 11:11 PM), https://www.timesofisrael.com/israeli-su
preme-court-president-invokes-nazi-era-in-implicit-swipe-at-netanyahu/ [https://perma.cc
/2CMZ-ECKU].
60 Yair Netanyahu (@YairNetanyahu), TWITTER (May 14, 2019, 5:32 AM), https://twitter
.com/YairNetanyahu/status/1128261905456476162?s=20 [https://perma.cc/ZDW2-LPRL] (in
Hebrew); see also Toi Staff, Netanyahu’s Son Lashes Chief Justice for Purportedly Comparing
His Dad to Hitler, TIMES ISR. (May 15, 2019, 7:41 AM), https://www.timesofisrael.com/net
anyahus-son-lashes-chief-justice-for-comparing-father-to-hitler/ [https://perma.cc/T8J9-XSNT].
The article discusses the argument by “the Movement for Governance and Democracy, a
right-wing activist group critical of the Israeli Supreme Court’s powers,” which announced
“[t]he court in Germany before the rise of the Nazis to power had the power to cancel laws,
and did so. But it was unable to prevent and may have even abetted the Nazi rise.” Id.
61 Michael Mandel, A Brief History of the New Constitutionalism, or “How We Changed
Everything So That Everything Would Remain the Same,” 32 ISR. L. REV. 250, 259 (1998)
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Constitution was very narrow.62 While the constitution recognized judicial review
of state law and executive ordinances and decrees, it was silent regarding acts of the
national legislature.63 The objection to judicial review arose mainly from the simple
reason that the Weimar Constitution had no superiority and was considered a law
like all other statutes, which can be changed according to the procedure stipulated
in Article 76.64 “As a rule,” Heinrich Nagel wrote, “a court could not review the ques-
tion whether a law of the Empire or of a single state was in conformity with any of
the fundamental rights of the Constitution.”65 The Constitution’s silence did not
preclude courts from gradually reviewing and even invalidating national legislation,
although this has occurred in very few cases.66 But that was the case when a law
conflicted with the constitution without being enacted by the required constitution-
amending majority.67 Judicial review of constitutional norms was not recognized.68
Could judicial review of constitutional norms (or laws enacted through the
constitution-amending majority) have hindered the Nazis’ rise to power? Surely, this
is a difficult question that involves hypothetical scenarios and alternative histo-
ries—ones which I do not intend to invent. The more interesting question is what if
the Weimer Constitution had included an explicit “unamendable provision” (as the
one included now in the Basic Law protecting the fundamental values of Germany
as a constitutional democracy) backed with the power of judicial review? Gregory
Fox and Georg Nolte remark that the framers of the German Basic Law believed that
if an unamendable provision “had been present in the Weimar Constitution, Hitler
would have been forced to violate the constitution openly before assuming virtually
dictatorial power. . . . [G]iven the traditional orderly and legalistic sentiment of the
German people, this might have made a difference.”69 Maybe or maybe not.
(“If anything, the problem with the Weimar Republic was an excess of judicial review, hindering
the democratic forces and helping the Nazis.”).
62 See Carl Joachim Friedrich, The Issue of Judicial Review in Germany, 43 POL. SCI. Q.
188, 199 (1928).
63 See id. at 193 (discussing the silence of the constitution as to both the question of
whether the Weimar Constitution was a fundamental law superior to ordinary legislation and
the question of judicial review, which led to disagreements between leading German com-
mentators on whether judicial review should be introduced).
64 See id. at 192.
65 Heinrich Nagel, Judicial Review in Germany, 3 AM. J. COMPAR. L. 233, 238 (1954).
66 See J.J. Lenoir, Judicial Review in Germany Under the Weimar Constitution, 14 TUL.
L. REV. 361, 369–70 (1940); Bernd J. Hartmann, The Arrival of Judicial Review in Germany
Under the Weimar Constitution of 1919, 18 BYU J. PUB. L. 107, 125 (2003); Michael Stolleis,
Judicial Review, Administrative Review, and Constitutional Review in the Weimar Republic,
16 RATIO JURIS 266, 270, 277 (2003).
67 See Lenoir, supra note 66, at 362.
68 See Nagel, supra note 65, at 237.
69 Gregory H. Fox & Georg Nolte, Intolerant Democracies, 36 HARV. INT’L L.J. 1, 19
(1995).
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In any event, the argument that judicial review did not prevent the rise of the
Nazis and is therefore useless,70 is reductio ad absurdum. The analogy is a ridiculous
one. It takes the extreme case Y and claims that since measure X did not assist in the
case of Y, it cannot assist in any other case. It is scientifically unfounded to take a
single extreme case and argue that it manifests the general rule that would always
apply. As I elaborate later, this is the result of a false dichotomy.71
But the question remains, can courts intervene and effectively block a law or a
constitutional amendment that manifests a clear attack on democracy? Can courts
protect against a law that would intentionally target a minority like redheads?72
In Israel, a recurring argument against authorizing the court to review Basic
Laws (i.e., laws of a constitutional status), is that in any case, when a basic law that
would truly harm democracy will arrive, its invalidation by the court would simply
be ignored and will not assist in protecting democracy. So, former Justice Minister
Shaked claimed in a public speech:
I do not accept the presumption as if the court has absolute priority
over Parliament in the area of human rights protection. As if Parlia-
ment hangs the redheads on electricity poles and the court goes
one pole by the other and taking them down. If Parliament would
enact a law that says ‘all redheads must be hanged’—the court will
not be able to assist because society has become so corrupted.73
And in another speech before the Plenary of the Knesset, Justice Minister Shaked
stated: “If the Knesset were to pass a law rescinding the voting rights of women or
70 See, e.g., Staff, supra note 60.
71 See infra note 79 and accompanying text.
72 The example of redheads being targeted is often given as an example for an extreme
and unreasonable action. See Short v. Poole Corp. [1925] 1 Ch 66, at 91 (Lord Warrington)
(Eng.) (“It may be also possible to prove that an act of the public body, though performed
in good faith and without the taint of corruption, was so clearly founded on alien and irrelevant
grounds as to be outside the authority conferred upon the body, and therefore inoperative.
It is difficult to suggest any act which would not be held ultra vires under this head, though
performed bona fide. To look for one example germane to the present case, I suppose that
if the defendants were to dismiss a teacher because she had red hair, or from some equally
frivolous and foolish reason, the Court would declare the attempted dismissal to be void.”).
Later, in the famous case Associated Provincial Picture Houses LTD v. Wednesbury Corp.,
Lord Green repeated this incident of a teacher fired from school because of her red hair as
an example of an unreasonable administrative decision, saying, “[t]hat is unreasonable in one
sense. In another sense it is taking into consideration extraneous matters. It is so unreasonable
that it might almost be described as being done in bad faith; and, in fact, all these things run
into one another.” Associated Provincial Picture Houses LTD v. Wednesbury Corp. [1948]
1 KB 223, at 229 (Lord Green) (Eng.).
73 Kohlet Policy Forum, Minister of Justice at Ecclesiastical Forum Conference: Dis-
qualification of Constitutional Amendments Dangerous, YOUTUBE(Oct. 9, 2018), https://www
.youtube.com/watch?v=moXqrpg4skQ [https://youtu.be/moXqrpg4skQ] (in Hebrew).
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red-haired people . . . this would signal the collapse of our democracy. In such a case,
I don’t think that even the court could save us from ourselves.”74 This argument was
not voiced by Shaked alone.75 Another former Minister of Justice, Professor Daniel
Friedmann, one of the more critical voices against judicial activism, has argued that
granting great power to the court is even dangerous.76 And Gadi Taub, a public
intellectual, continued this line of thought:
[I]f, God forbid, the majority’s values will cease to be demo-
cratic—like the horror scenarios that are thrown to the air in the
current discussions, describing how the majority would decide
to take away the right to vote of Arabs or redheads—then no
court would be able to stop Democracy’s destruction.77
These statements allude to the famous wording of Learned Hand:
[T]his much I think I do know—that society so riven that the
spirit of moderation is gone, no court can save; that a society
where that spirit flourishes, no court need save; that in a society
which evades its responsibility by thrusting upon the courts the
nurture of that spirit, that spirit in the end will perish.78
With all due respect, this argument presents a fallacy. It falls to the false dichotomy
of democratic failure: either we have a perfectly functioning democracy or a complete
failure, Weimar style.79 But that is never the case; the court’s influence on democracy
is not measured in the final hypothetical law that transforms a country from a demo-
cratic one to an autocracy but incrementally and gradually in a series of judgments
74 See Levin, supra note 21.
75 Daniel Friedmann, The Knesset is Dangerous, but the Supreme Court is More Dangerous,
YNET (Oct. 8, 2018), https://www.ynet.co.il/articles/0,7340,L-5365724,00.html [https://perma
.cc/TFK2-WWVL] (in Hebrew).
76 Id. (“In contrast with the zero chance that the Knesset [Israeli Parliament] would cancel
democracy, if we allow the court to review constitutional norms we would find ourselves
open to much greater risks. Whoever thinks that the court would only deal with a Basic Law
(no one imagines to enact) to cancel democracy, would realize that the court is dealing with
all basic laws and re-writing them.”).
77 Gadi Taub, The Majority Will Decide Its Basic Values, HAARETZ (Oct. 11, 2018), https://
www.haaretz.co.il/opinions/.premium-1.6550428 [https://perma.cc/N5N6-LGJQ] (in Hebrew).
78 LEARNED HAND, The Constitution of an Independent Judiciary to Civilization, in THE
SPIRIT OF LIBERTY: PAPERS AND ADDRESS OF LEARNED HAND 155, 164 (Irving Dillard ed.,
1942).
79 PATRICK J. HURLEY, A CONCISE INTRODUCTION TO LOGIC 161 (11th ed. 2011) (“The
fallacy of false dichotomy is committed when a disjunctive (‘either. . . or . . .’) premise presents
two unlikely alternatives as if they were the only ones available, and the arguer then eliminates
the undesirable alternative, leaving the desirable one as the conclusion.”) (emphasis omitted).
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in the life of a nation.80 As Eugene Rostow noted, “It may of course be true that no
court can save a society bent on ruin. . . . But the work of the Court can have, and
when wisely exercised does have, the effect not of inhibiting but of releasing and
encouraging the dominantly democratic forces of American life.”81 The dichotomy
between a perfectly functioning democracy and a complete failure is a false one. In
fact, between these two extremes there is a vast spectrum in which courts can function
as a useful stop sign or a speed bump against constitutional and legal reforms aiming
to undermine or erode the democratic order.82
B. Judicial Review as a Useful Speed Bump or Stop Sign
Often, when courts declare constitutional amendments that would significantly
harm the democratic constitutional order as unconstitutional, such judicial decisions
may slow down—even if not completely stop—authoritarian initiatives until differ-
ent political actors gain power.83 Elsewhere, I have elaborated on the different uses
of constitutional amendment judicial review in protecting democracy in countries
such as Taiwan, Colombia, and Uganda.84 In Taiwan, on March 24, 2000, the Council
of Grand Justices announced Interpretation No. 499 in which it declared the Fifth
Amendment to the Constitution as unconstitutional.85 The amendment, ratified (by
anonymous balloting) on September 4, 1999, turned the Third National Assembly into
an unelected body by providing that the Fourth National Assembly be appointed
from the various political parties according to the ratio of votes each party received
in the corresponding Legislative Yuan election.86 It also extended the National As-
sembly term by two additional years.87 The Council of Grand Justices invalidated
the amendment on the grounds that it violated certain basic constitutional principles
that are the foundation of the constitution’s very existence.88 In retrospect, David KC
Huang and Nigel NT Li wrote:
80 Eugene V. Rostow, The Democratic Character of Judicial Review, 66 HARV. L. REV.
193, 193, 210, 213 (1952).
81 Id. at 207, 210.
82 Yaniv Roznai, The Uses and Abuses of Constitutional Unamendability, in THE ROUT-
LEDGE HANDBOOK OF COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGE 150, 157, 159–61 (Xenophon
Contiades & Alkmene Fotiadou eds., 2020).
83 See Rosalind Dixon & David Landau, Transnational Constitutionalism and a Limited
Doctrine of Unconstitutional Constitutional Amendment, 13 INT’LJ.CONST.L.606, 636 (2015).
84 Roznai, supra note 82, at 157–60.
85 Judicial Interpretation No. 499 [2000] (promulgated by the Constitutional Court, March 24,
2000), translated in CONST. CT. INTERP., https://cons.judicial.gov.tw/jcc/en-us/jep03/show
?expno=499#secSeven [https://perma.cc/TAE7-8497] (last visited Dec. 8, 2020).
86 Id.
87 Id.
88 Id.; see generally David S. Law & Hsiang-Yang Hsieh, Judicial Review of Constitu-
tional Amendments: Taiwan, in CONSTITUTIONALISM IN CONTEXT 31, 35, 40 (David S. Law
ed., forthcoming 2020) (manuscript at 31, 35, 40), http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3359520
[https://perma.cc/JH7X-GEKB].
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When looking back on Judicial Yuan Interpretation No. 499
[2000] in its twentieth anniversary year, it is no exaggeration to
say that the hard work of at least three generations brought an
end to the Chinese political tradition of lifelong tenure. The In-
terpretation set a milestone marking Taiwan’s progress towards
democratisation and constitutionalisation, because no politician
in this country dare to extend his or her term of office from that
point onward.89
With this decision, the democratic constitutional order in Taiwan was preserved.90
Another example arrives from a recent judicial decision in Uganda. On July 26,
2018, the Constitutional Court of Uganda delivered a landmark 814-page-long
judgment embracing and incorporating the Indian “basic structure doctrine” and
holding that parliament has limited amendment powers.91 The court ruled by a 4–1
majority to uphold provisions of a constitutional amendment that removed the
presidential age limit, according to which anyone over the age of seventy-five is
banned from running for the presidency.92 Nevertheless, all judges decided that the
amendment’s provision extending the term of office for Members of Parliament
from five to seven years is unconstitutional and void.93 In this case, the result por-
trays a more complex picture. On the one hand, the court assisted in blocking the
misuse of the amendment power by the Members of Parliament who wished to
extend their term of office.94 Judicial review, in this case, was a useful tool against
abusive constitutionalism. However, from the perspective of erosion through in-
cumbent takeover, extending the legislative term did not pose a greater threat to
democracy than allowing the removal of the presidential age limit, which paved the
way for seventy-four-year-old President Yoweri Museveni to run for reelection in
89 David KC Huang & Nigel NT Li, Unconstitutional Constitutional Amendment in
Taiwan: A Retrospective Analysis of Judicial Yuan Interpretation No. 499 (2000), 15 U. PA.
ASIAN L. REV. 427 (2020).
90 See Wu Sheng-Wen, Popular Sovereignty and Limitations on Constitutional
Amendments—Dissertate from Constitutional Interpretation No. 499 of the Grand Justices,
Judicial Yuan (June 7, 2005) (Masters Thesis, Graduate Institution of Political Science,
National Sun Yat-Sen University), https://etd.lis.nsysu.edu.tw/ETD-db/ETD-search/view_etd
?URN=etd-0607105-185141 [https://perma.cc/QN5H-HNS9].
91 Mabirizi v. Att’y Gen., Constitutional Appeals No. 02, 03 and 04 of 2018 at 1, 11,
19–21, 101 (Uganda) (ULII).
92 Id. at 10, 109–10.
93 Justice Kakuru’s dissent was that the entire amendment is unconstitutional and void.
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2021, his thirty-sixth year in office.95 In April 2019, Uganda’s Supreme Court upheld
by a majority of 4–3 the constitutional amendment to remove the age limit.96 And, in
September 2020, the East African Court of Justice unanimously ruled that the removal
of the presidential age limit did not violate the East African Community Treaty.97
A third example comes from Colombia. After the Colombian Constitutional Court
allowed Uribe to amend the constitution to seek a second consecutive term, in 2010
the Constitutional Court invalidated a referendum that would have allowed President
Alvaro Uribe to seek a third consecutive term in office.98 A third consecutive
presidential term, the Constitutional Court held, would concentrate executive power,
cause severe damage to institutional checks on the president, and force the political
opposition to compete on a greatly tilted playing field.99 Accordingly, such a reform
would be an unconstitutional constitutional replacement. Since this judgment, President
Uribe has left power peacefully, and it appears that the Constitutional Court played
a central role in protecting against an erosion of democracy in Colombia.100
These cases demonstrate that with the power to review—and even invalidate—
constitutional amendments, courts do have the potential ability to protect democracy.101
However, is this always the case?
In a recent study, Michael Hein examined judicial review of constitutional
amendments in forty-nine European countries with entrenched constitutions from
95 Bukola Adebayo & Samson Ntale, Uganda Court Upholds Law That Could Allow
Yoweri Museveni Be President for Life, CNN (July 27, 2018, 2:56 PM), https://www.cnn.com
/2018/07/27/africa/uganda-presidential-age-limit/index.html [https://perma.cc/C3KG-9WG2].
96 Mabirizi, Constitutional Appeals 02, 03, and 04, at 1–2, 10–11; see Uganda’s Top Court
Upholds Ruling to Remove Presidential Age Caps, E. AFR. (April 18, 2019), https://www
.theeastafrican.co.ke/tea/news/east-africa/uganda-s-top-court-upholds-ruling-to-remove
-presidential-age-caps-1416174 [https://perma.cc/FM8J-98ZK].
97 See Mabirizi v. Att’y Gen., Reference No. 6 of 2019 at 96, 136 (E. Afr. Ct. J. 2019),
https://www.eacj.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/09/Reference-No.-6-of-20191.pdf
[https://perma.cc/JHX8-26JV]; Crispin Adriaanse, Court Gives Museveni Green Light to Run
in Uganda’s 2021 Elections, IOL (Oct. 1, 2020), https://www.iol.co.za/news/africa/court
-gives-museveni-green-light-to-run-in-ugandas-2021-elections-8b66e2fd-c9fe-5e48-99d4
-09d2108c41c4 [https://perma.cc/M6R5-CPE7].
98 See generally Corte Constitucional [C.C.] [Constitutional Court], februero 26, 2010,
Sentencis C-141/10 (Colom.), http://www.corteconstitucional.gov.co/relatoria/2010/c-141-10
.htm [https://perma.cc/L57Y-VDCQ]; MANUEL JOSÉ CEPEDA ESPINOSA & DAVID LANDAU,
COLOMBIAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: LEADING CASES 352 (2017).
99 ESPINOSA & LANDAU, supra note 98, at 354–55.
100 Dixon & Landau, supra note 38, at 275–76. Importantly, Huq wrote, “The decision,
however, was only possible because the court had initially avoided a confrontation with
Uribe, and instead had delayed intervention until it would have maximum effect and might
generate more public support.” Aziz Z. Huq, Democratic Erosion and the Courts: Com-
parative Perspectives, 93 N.Y.U. L. REV. ONLINE 21, 23 (2018).
101 See supra notes 90, 96, 98 and accompanying text.
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1945 to 2016.102 He found 154 decisions on the constitutionality of constitutional
amendments and, according to his analysis:
In 44 decisions (28.6%), amendments were completely
(N=26/16.9%) or partially (N=18/11.7%) declared unconstitu-
tional, whereas 110 decisions (71.4%) accepted the respective
amendment entirely. The vast majority of all decisions (137 of
154 cases, 89.0%) were taken in countries whose constitutions
contained a general entrenchment clause at the time of the deci-
sion. Among the 44 invalidations, 38 were made based on a gen-
eral entrenchment clause, whereas five decisions were made on
procedural grounds, and one decision was based on the supremacy
of international law. Not a single amendment was invalidated
based on implicit amendment limitations.103
There has been a recent development in Europe concerning the latter type of
limitation:
[O]n 30 January 2019, . . . the Constitutional Court of Slovakia
delivered a judgment in which it declared, for the first time in its
history, a constitutional amendment as “unconstitutional” and void.
The unconstitutional amendment concerned security clearance
by the national security authority of judges and judicial candi-
dates. In a judgment that exceeded 100 pages, the Constitutional
Court held that “the Constitution contains an implicit substantive
core, which consists of the principles of democracy and rule of
law, including the principle of separation of powers and the
related independence of judiciary.” Moreover, “not even consti-
tutional laws may violate this implicit substantive core of the
Constitution.” . . . [T]he Constitutional Court has the power to
examine constitutional laws for possible violations of the im-
plicit substantive core of the Constitution and if it finds a viola-
tion, it has the power to declare unconformity of the respective
constitutional law with the implicit core of the Constitution.104
102 Michael Hein, The Least Dangerous Branch? Constitutional Review of Constitutional
Amendments in Europe, in COURTS,POLITICS AND CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: JUDICIALIZATION
OF POLITICS AND POLITICIZATION OF THE JUDICIARY 187, 194 (Martin Belov ed., 2020)
[hereinafter Hein, The Least Dangerous Branch?]; see also Michael Hein, Do Constitutional
Entrenchment Clauses Matter? Constitutional Review of Constitutional Amendments in Europe,
18 INT’L J. CONST. L. 78, 78–110 (2020).
103 Hein, The Least Dangerous Branch?, supra note 102, at 194–95.
104 Lech Garlicki & Yaniv Roznai, Introduction: Constitutional Unamendability in Europe,
21 EUR. J.L. REFORM 217, 217–18 (2019).
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Thereby, the Slovak Constitutional Court, for the first time in Europe’s history,
invalidated a constitutional amendment using the doctrine of implied limitations.105
Returning to Hein’s study, in thirteen decisions, courts struck down constitutional
amendments for procedural irregularities or substantive violations of an unamendable
provision.106 In these cases, he notes, “The courts thus effectively contributed to the
protection of the democratic order.”107 However, the courts’ ability to protect the
democratic order is not perfect. As he indicates, in six decisions, courts restrained
themselves from invalidating the reviewed amendments, although they breached (or
had the potential to breach) the amendment procedure, international law, or an un-
amendable provision.108 Out of these six cases, four amendments have become part
of the constitution (two amendments were eventually not enacted).109 “In these cases,”
he writes, “the courts refrained from circumventing damages to the democratic
constitutional order.”110
What about the other remaining decisions of invalidations? Here, Hein and I are
in dispute. Hein writes that “almost twice as many decisions (N=34) were . . . ac-
tivist interventions, where the courts illegitimately interfered with the constitutional
amendment process.”111 It is not entirely clear in all these decisions, just because the
courts acted in an “activist” manner, that they did not assist in protecting the demo-
cratic order. For Hein, when reviewing amendments vis-à-vis unamendable provi-
sions, courts act legitimately only when they acknowledge “competing constitutional
interpretations as equally legitimate and leaving it to the democratically legitimated
amending power to choose between them.”112 Hein gives an example:
If . . . a constitutional eternity clause protects the independence of
the judiciary, the court would be allowed (and obliged) to invali-
date any amendment that would infringe on that principle (e.g.,
the introduction of a right of the minister of justice to intervene
in court proceedings). In contrast, amendments that only reform the
way an independent judiciary is organized, for example, a change
from the judicial self-management model to the management-by-
the-executive model, would have to be accepted.113
105 Ústavný súd [Constitutional Court] Jan. 30, 2019, Pl. ÚS 21/2014-96 (Slovk.), https://
www.ustavnysud.sk/documents/10182/0/PL_+US+21_2014.pdf/233a617c-4dfd-4151-8a6b
-16d180b27111 [https://perma.cc/SQ8P-GZZP].
106 Hein, The Least Dangerous Branch?, supra note 102, at 199.
107 Id.
108 Id. at 199–201.
109 Id. at 201.
110 Id.
111 Id. at 199.
112 Id. at 193.
113 Id.
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I am not convinced that in the context of democratic erosion and populist constitu-
tionalism, when courts may be threatened, pressured, or packed, a decision concerning
judicial appointment cannot help in guarding democracy.
As Ginsburg and Huq claim, “constitutional provisions on judicial appoint-
ments, removal, and salaries are rarely immunized from constitutional amendment.
Hence, it is typically fairly easy for a would-be autocrat to first gain control of the
judicial apparatus before turning to amending other features of the constitution.”114
Indeed, limiting judicial independence is one of the main indicators of “constitu-
tional regression.”115 One such mechanism to capture the court is court-packing, as
well as increasing the size of the court, decreasing the number of sitting judges, and
replacing sitting judges with “loyal” ones.116 Accordingly, in order to protect the
democratic order in its entirety, there may be a “strong justification for applying the
[unconstitutional constitutional amendments] doctrine especially in cases concerning
judicial independence and separation of powers.”117 The recent case of the Slovak
Constitutional Court may be such an example. The court acted in an “activist” man-
ner as it acted without a formal unamendable provision or eternity clause. Instead,
it relied on the constitution’s substantive core—an implicit eternity—which serves
as a limitation on the constitutional amendment power, in a manner that “every
constitutional amendment can, therefore, be unconstitutional if it . . . does not respect
substantive elements of the core.”118 The Court noted that if candidates for judicial
office and incumbent judges could be subject to National Security Authority sur-
veillance, the latter might be in a position to exert undue pressure on the judiciary.119
The Constitutional Court thus regarded the amendment as violating separation of
powers and judicial independence. The independence of the judiciary, alík notes,
was indeed endangered: “judicial independence is one of the structural values (besides
114 GINSBURG & HUQ, supra note 6, at 174.
115 Zoltán Szente, Subverting Judicial Independence in the New Authoritarian Regimes:
Comparing Polish and Hungarian Judicial Reforms, in THE ROLE OF COURTS IN CON-
TEMPORARY LEGAL ORDERS, supra note 48, at 341,341–42. See generally Angela Di Gregorio,
Constitutional Courts in the Context of Constitutional Regression—Some Comparative
Remarks, in COURTS, POLITICS AND CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, supra note 102, at 209.
116 David Kosar & Katarina Sipulova, How to Fight Court-Packing?, 6 CONST.STUD. 133,
133–64 (2020).
117 See Yaniv Roznai & Tamar Hostovsky Brandes, Democratic Erosion, Populist Consti-
tutionalism, and the Unconstitutional Constitutional Amendments Doctrine, 14 L. & ETHICS
HUM. RTS. 19, 47 (2020).
118 Tomáš alík, Case Note, The Slovak Constitutional Court on Unconstitutional
Constitutional Amendment (PL. ÚS 21/2014), 16 EUR.CONST.L.REV. (forthcoming) (manu-
script at 5), https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/european-constitutional-law-review/arti
cle/slovak-constitutional-court-on-unconstitutional-constitutional-amendment-pl-us-212
014/98FEFF484AA569FDDD21202E77BF6E08 [https://perma.cc/YN97-SRC8].
119 Id. at 6 (noting that there was also “a real risk of misuse of the information collected,
the possibility of boundless security checks, a lack of rules governing the storage of said
information, and even the possibility that judges would be blackmailed”).
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the rule of law, democracy, and human rights) that stands in stark opposition to the
previous authoritarian regime. Therefore, the reviewed regulation had a substantial,
negative impact on judicial independence.”120 The judgment, he correctly notes,
should be regarded as an attempt by the court to mend the flexibility of the Slovak
Constitution, which makes it vulnerable to abuse of the amending power:
[T]he Constitutional Court recognised that flexibility was a
problem when it noted that the existence of a substantive core
meant that the Constitution was no longer helpless against the
forces of a qualified majority of MPs and the possible misuse of
the power to amend the Constitution. A victory in parliamentary
elections was not tantamount to a coup d’état.121
In that respect, he adds, “The power to declare an amendment unconstitutional may
guard the democratic legitimacy of the whole system.”122 If this is the case with
implicit unamendability, it is all the more so with explicit unamendability, protecting
judicial independence. Hein himself writes that “29 out of the 34 activist interven-
tions among the studied court decisions were based on constitutional entrenchment
clauses.”123 The mere fact that, in these cases, the courts took “a specific but contro-
versial vision of the constitution” does not mean that they have not assisted in
protecting the democratic order.124
In the literature, skeptical and critical voices were pronounced about the ability
of courts to build and protect democracy.125 Courts are not a perfect safety mecha-
nism for the democratic order. Often, they may even harm democracy.126 But still,
as I have demonstrated, courts can play an important role in guarding democracy.127
120 Id. at 15.
121 Id. at 9.
122 Id. at 10.
123 Hein, The Least Dangerous Branch?, supra note 102, at 201–02.
124 For this reason, our conclusions are different. For Hein, “[t]hese results disprove the
optimistic assumption that courts predominantly protect the democratic constitutional order
by reviewing constitutional amendments.” Id. at 201. In the author’s opinion, in at least
thirteen cases, and probably in many out of the other thirty-four cases, courts assisted in
protecting basic constitutional principles from encroachments.
125 On the limits of courts as democracy-builders in states emerging from authoritarian
rule, see generally TOM GERALD DALY, THE ALCHEMISTS: QUESTIONING OUR FAITH IN
COURTS AS DEMOCRACY-BUILDERS (2017).
126 This is especially true once they are already captured by the government. See David
Landau & Rosalind Dixon, Abusive Judicial Review: Courts Against Democracy, 53 UC
DAVIS L. REV. 1313, 1373 (2020).
127 This argument supplements other studies concerning the positive role of courts. See,
e.g., Rafael La Porta et al., Judicial Checks and Balances, 112 J. POL. ECON. 445, 445 (2004)
(finding “strong support for the proposition that both judicial independence and constitu-
tional review are associated with greater freedom”); Douglas M. Gibler & Kirk A. Randazzo,
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Sethi is correct in claiming that “[i]n such situations where democracy is subverted
by constitutional amendments and legal means, constitutional courts are in a unique
position to identify these legal threats and can often provide a much-needed appara-
tus to countries and prevent their democratic erosion.”128
According to Sethi, there are institutional advantages of constitutional courts
exercising what he terms “democratic protectionism,” among them: (1) courts can
identify threats on democracy and tackle them on their own and without other
institutions; (2) they are comprised of highly trained and experienced individuals
capable of dealing with constitutional issues and are thus situated better than other
institutions to decide whether a law erodes the constitutional democratic order; (3)
they allow the people take a role in protecting democracy by accepting petitions; and
(4) by hearing petitions and publishing judgments, they elevate contested issues to
the public sphere, encouraging a broader national dialogue.129 By exercising judicial
review, courts can thus assist in protecting democracy.
In what follows, the author wishes to claim that regardless of the actual act of
judicial review of amendments, i.e., irrespective of the number of invalidations of
amendments that have breached unamendable principles, the mere possibility that
a court might invalidate amendments assists in protecting the democratic order ex
ante during the legislative process itself.
C. Judicial Review and the Sword of Damocles
Courts can, as noted earlier, play a role as guardians of democracy by adjudicating
and invalidating constitutional amendments.130 They may also protect democracy by
declaring the “suspected” nature of constitutional amendments and asking the leg-
islature to reconsider the amendment, thereby “passing the ball” to the political
arena.131 A serious pronunciation by the Court that a given constitutional amendment
infringes fundamental constitutional principles may not be taken lightly by the legis-
lative authority, which softens the infringement.132
Testing the Effects of Independent Judiciaries on the Likelihood of Democratic Backsliding,
55 AM.J.POL.SCI. 696, 696 (2011) (finding “that established independent judiciaries prevent
regime changes toward authoritarianism across all types of states”).
128 Sethi, supra note 58, at 25.
129 Id. at 25–26.
130 See Dixon & Landau, supra note 83, at 606.
131 See, e.g., Ahmed v. Federation of Pakistan, (2010) PLD (SC) 1165, ¶ 13 (Pak.) (“[W]e
would like to refer to the Parliament for re-consideration, the issue . . . introduced by Article
175A of the Constitution, inter alia, in the light of the concerns/reservations expressed and
observations/suggestions made hereinabove.”).
132 Consider the following example from Pakistan: The Eighteenth Amendment to the
Constitution of Pakistan sought, inter alia, to change the appointments process for judges of
the High Courts and the Supreme Court by envisaging an almost equal role in that process
for the executive and the legislature. This amendment was challenged immediately before
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However, even before an amendment is enacted, the mere possibility of judicial
review of amendments has an “anticipatory effect” that assists in protecting democ-
racy.133 Imagine a constitutional system with a recognized scheme of judicial review
of constitutional amendments, either based on an explicit unamendable provision or
on an implicit unamendable material core, Slovak style, or à la Indian “basic structure”
model. A proposal to amend the constitution is then discussed in Parliament. Some
members of Parliament raise the fear that some of the proposal’s provisions violate
the constitution’s unamendable principles or its material core. Such an alleged vio-
lation, that creates the possibility that a court may invalidate the amendment, either in
full or in part, may bring substantive modifications to the proposed amendment during
the legislative process. As Mark Tushnet correctly notes, the mere existence of
unamendability doctrines “may serve as a political check on the amendment process,
as a ‘sword of Damocles’ that, because it occasionally drops, cautions political actors
against devoting too many resources to attempting to alter the existing specification
of some component of the [constitution’s] basic structure.”134
Indeed, even without actual judicial review of amendments and—as I will demon-
strate with regards to Israel—even without a clear acknowledgment of such an
authority, the mere possibility or threat of invalidation of a constitutional amendment
carries a preventative effect in making sure that proposed constitutional changes
align with the constitution’s core principles during the legislation process.135 Just as in
ordinary legislation, legislators engage in what Alec Stone Sweet calls “autolimitation,”
or the modification of proposals in the anticipation of judicial review in regard to
constitutional reform.136 The legislators anticipate judicial invalidation and often
respond to it by modifying the bill to make it “constitutionally sound,”137 and the
the Supreme Court on the ground that it violated the basic structure and salient features of
the constitution. The Court passed a “short order,” referred the matter back to the Parliament,
and offered advice on how to modify the Eighteenth Amendment to make it conform to the
constitution. Id. Accordingly, Parliament enacted the Nineteenth Amendment and softened
the earlier change in the appointments process by retaining a more predominant role for the
judiciary in that process. This amendment withstood challenge. Bhatti v. Federation of
Pakistan, (2011) PLD (SC) 407, ¶¶ 2, 10 (Pak.). See Saroop Ijaz, Judicial Appointments in
Pakistan: Coming Full Circle, 1 LUMS L.J. 86, 87–89 (2014).
133 See Georg Vanberg, Abstract Judicial Review, Legislative Bargaining, and Policy
Compromise, 10 J. THEORETICAL POL. 299, 314 (1998).
134 Mark Tushnet, Amendment Theory and Constituent Power, in COMPARATIVE CON-
STITUTIONAL THEORY 317, 332 (Gary Jacobsohn & Miguel Schor eds., 2018).
135 See Vanberg, supra note 133, at 314.
136 According to Stone Sweet, “‘autolimitation’—refers to the exercise of self-restraint on the
part of the government and its parliamentary majority in anticipation of an annulment by the
constitutional court.” Alec Stone Sweet, The Politics of Constitutional Review in France and
Europe, 5 INT’LJ.CONST.L. 69, 87 (2007); see also ALECSTONE,THE BIRTH OF JUDICIALPOL-
ITICS IN FRANCE:THE CONSTITUTIONAL COUNCIL IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 122 (1992).
137 Vanberg, supra note 133, at 303.
350 WILLIAM & MARY BILL OF RIGHTS JOURNAL [Vol. 29:327
same applies to constitutional amendments. This “anticipatory effect of judicial
review” is a natural result of legislative-judicial interactions.138
An example could be the enactment process of Basic Law: Israel as The Nation
State of the Jewish People, enacted on July 19, 2018.139 This basic law represents a
new chapter in the Israeli Constitution, the making-process of which is still ongoing.140
It states that Israel is the Nation State of the Jewish People but is regarded as highly
controversial as it does not mention the democratic character of the state or the
principle of equality, and thus is regarded as problematic for its alienation of the
non-Jewish minority in the state.141 The basic law represents a central attempt by the
political branches to target the state’s national identity, seeking to shift the balance
between the state’s “Jewish and Democratic” commitments in favor of the former.142
As Menachem Mautner notes, the enactment of Basic Law: The Nation State occurred
at the height of the animosity of Israeli Religious-Zionists and Israeli nationalists to
the constitutional project of the Court in an attempt to offset the liberal constitu-
tional project embarked on in the 1990s.143
138 For a game-theory model of this interaction, see Georg Vanberg, Legislative-Judicial
Relations: A Game-Theoretic Approach to Constitutional Review, 45 AM. J. POL. SCI. 346,
346 (2001).
139 Suzie Navot & Yaniv Roznai, From Supra-Constitutional Principles to the Misuse of
Constituent Power in Israel, 21 EUR. J.L. REFORM 403, 420 (2019).
140 Adam Shinar, Accidental Constitutionalism: The Political Foundations and Implications
of Constitution-Making in Israel, in SOCIAL AND POLITICAL FOUNDATIONS OF CONSTITUTIONS
207, 208 (Denis J. Galligan & Mila Versteeg eds., 2013).
141 See Suzie Navot, A New Chapter in Israel’s “Constitution”: Israel as the Nation State
of the Jewish People, VERFASSUNGSBLOG (July 27, 2018), https://verfassungsblog.de/a-new
-chapter-in-israels-constitution-israel-as-the-nation-state-of-the-jewish-people/ [https://perma
.cc/DCJ7-HGGZ]. For various perspectives on the basic law, see generally DEFININGISRAEL:
THE JEWISH STATE, DEMOCRACY, AND THE LAW (Simon Rabinovitch ed., 2018); Ilan Peleg,
Introduction to Israel Dialectics—The 2018 Basic Law: Israel as the Nation-State of the Jewish
People, 25 ISR. STUD. 132 (2020); Eugene Kontorovich, A Comparative Constitutional
Perspective on Israel’s Nation-State Law, 25 ISR. STUD. 137 (2020); Rami Zeedan, Recon-
sidering the Druze Narrative in the Wake of the Basic Law: Israel as the Nation-State of the
Jewish People, 25 ISR. STUD. 153 (2020); Alexander Yakobson, Jewish Nation-State, Not
This Law, 25 ISR.STUD. 167 (2020); Dov Waxman & Ilan Peleg, The Nation-State Law and the
Weakening of Israeli Democracy, 25 ISR. STUD. 185 (2020); Gad Barzilai, A Land of Conflict:
Law as a Means of Hegemony, 25 ISR. STUD. 201 (2020); Orit Kamir, Basic Law: Israel as
Nation-State—National Honor Defies Human Dignity and Universal Human Rights, 25 ISR.
STUD. 213 (2020); Ilan Troen & Natan Aridan, Introduction to Adalah Petition to Israel’s
High Court of Justice, 25 ISR.STUD. 228 (2020); Adalah, Adalah Petition to Israel’s High Court
of Justice Proposed Basic Law: Israel—The Nation State, 25 ISR. STUD. 229 (2020); Abraham
Bell, The Counter-Revolutionary Nation-State Law, 25 ISR. STUD. 240 (2020); Doreen
Lustig, “We The Majority . . .”: The Israeli Nationality Basic Law, 25 ISR.STUD. 256 (2020).
142 See Navot & Roznai, supra note 139, at 420.
143 See generally Menachem Mautner, Protection of Liberal Rights Amidst A “War of
Cultures” (Kulturkampf) Between Secular and Religious Groups, 48 ISR. Y.B. HUM. RTS.
125 (2018).
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While several petitions were submitted against this new basic law, the question
of whether the Court has the authority to review a law carrying a constitutional
status remains open and in the center of heated public debates.144 Whereas the High
Court of Justice ordered that an extended panel of eleven judges hear the arguments
on the constitutionality of Basic Law: the Nation State,145 former Minister of Justice,
Ayelet Shaked, repeatedly argued that the Supreme Court lacks the authority to
review basic laws, and that if it would invalidate Basic Law: The Nation State there
would “be an earthquake, a war between the authorities.”146 In contrast, together
with Suzie Navot, this author has claimed that:
In Israel, where the legislature is composed of a single
chamber, when basic laws are easily amended, coupled with the
dominance of the government in the legislative process, there is
a greater fear of an abuse of constituent power. Judicial review
of basic laws, especially in the absence of any supra-national court,
seems necessary. Otherwise, the Knesset that possesses two hats—
the ordinary legislature and the constituent authority—would
practically be omnipotent and would be able to render immune any
law from judicial review simply by labelling it as a ‘basic law.’147
Regardless of the actual question of whether the Court should possess the
authority to review basic laws, the mere possibility, even if only still theoretical, that
it would review the basic law was essential in the legislative process for modifying
several provisions of the then proposed basic law that were considered extremely
violative of the state’s democratic character.148
To take one example, section 7 of Basic Law: The Nation State, originally
included in the bill, proposed the following: “[T]he State may allow a community,
including followers of a single religion or members of a single nationality, to
144 Notwithstanding some judicial statements in obiter dictum, the Israeli Supreme Court
has never formally adopted the idea of substantive limits on the Knesset’s constituent
authority. For a review, see Navot & Roznai, supra note 139, at 412–14.
145 Yonah Jeremy Bob, High Court Broadens Panel Hearing of Nation-State Law,
JERUSALEM POST (Jan. 1, 2019, 8:40 PM), https://www.jpost.com/Israel-News/High-Court
-broadens-panel-hearing-of-Nation-State-Law-in-petition-to-11-justices-576053.
146 Revital Hovel & Noa Shpigel, Israel’s Justice Minister Warns of ‘An Earthquake’ if
Top Court Kills Nation-state Law, HAARETZ (Aug. 5, 2018, 10:21 PM), https://www.haaretz
.com/israel-news/.premium-justice-minister-warns-of-earthquake-if-court-kills-nation-state
-law-1.6343122 [https://perma.cc/J9BY-PXDU]; Ayelet Shaked, Opinion, The Basic Law
of All of Us, ISR. HAYOM (Aug. 2, 2018, 1:23 PM), https://www.israelhayom.co.il/opinion
/576425 [https://perma.cc/ZVW9-6L2M] (in Hebrew).
147 Navot & Roznai, supra note 139, at 421–22.
148 For an example involving Section 7 of Basic Law: The Nation State, see generally
Ronit Levin-Schnur & Adam Shinar, Section 7 of Basic Law: The Nation—Can the Disputes
Be Settled?, DEMOCRATIC CULTURE (forthcoming 2020) (on file with author) (in Hebrew).
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establish a separate communal settlement.”149 Early in the legislative debates, the
legal advisory to the Knesset warned that such a provision, which deals with
fundamental rights and principles, raises difficulties.150 Especially, the legal advisors
of the government and the Knesset expressed objections to exclusion based on
nationality.151 The main discussion concerned the relationship between this section
and the principle of equality.152 Those objecting to the provisions, to whom the
Attorney General joined, claimed that the provision violated the principle of equal-
ity, established discrimination in housing at a constitutional level, and contributed
to segregation more generally.153 Thus, the parliamentary committee responsible for
drafting the bill was confronted with an objection by the Attorney General that
section 7 contradicts the principle of equality, may offend Israel at the international
law level, and may by invalidated by the court.154 It was expressly argued in the
committee that the provision might trigger the “unconstitutional constitutional
amendment” doctrine.155 In light of the various objections, alternative options were
examined and eventually the provision was modified to the following statement:
“The [S]tate considers the development of Jewish settlement a national value, [a]nd
will act to encourage and promote its establishment . . . .”156 This vague declaration
149 Raoul Wootliff, In Rare Rebuke, Rivlin Urges MKs to Amend ‘Discriminatory’ Jewish
State Bill, TIMES ISR. (July 10, 2018, 10:03 AM), https://www.timesofisrael.com/in-rare-re
buke-rivlin-urges-mks-to-amend-discriminatory-jewish-state-bill [https://perma.cc/R5X9
-R5PT] (quoting language from an earlier version of the bill).
150 Id.
151 See Levin-Schnur & Shinar, supra note 148.
152 Id.
153 Id.
154 During the discussion, Prof. Yedidia Stern of the Israeli Democracy Institute said:
I want to repeat what Eyal Yinon just said and I am not convinced
everyone listened. Friends, this law, section 7(b), if enacted will cer-
tainly be invalidated by the court. . . . So, no one can say ‘I didn’t
know. . . . [W]e are knowingly heading towards a constitutional crisis
we have never had alike. Knowingly. Section 7(b) will be invalidated,
because it is clearly racial discriminatory. No judge can approve it.
[Then, Eyal Yinon, the Legal Advisor to the Knesset clarified:]
I did not establish, and certainly have no ability to estimate and declare
that this provision . . . would certainly be invalidated by the Supreme
Court. I did not say this. I said that one cannot preclude from possibility
that at least sec. 7(b), that contradicts basic principles recognized by
the Supreme Court, would be invalidated. But there is a problem how
would it be nullified, if it will. This can only be done by adopting a
doctrine never adopted by the court [up] until now—the unconstitu-
tional constitutional amendment doctrine.
Protocol No. 15 to the Joint Committee of the Knesset Committee and Constitution, Law and
Justice Committee, Discussing Bill Basic Law: Israel—the Nation State of the Jewish People,
DK, 20th Knesset, Session No. 4 (2018) 31, 47–48 (Isr.) (in Hebrew).
155 See Levin-Schnur & Shinar, supra note 148.
156 Id.
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is less discriminatory than the previously explicit statement and is open to various
interpretations.157
Another example concerns a constitutional amendment that allows the removal
from the legislature of lawmakers whose actions constitute incitement to racism or
support for an armed struggle against the State of Israel.158 Originally, the bill
included another justification for removal of a Member of Parliament: if he or she
negates the existence of the State of Israel as a Jewish and democratic state.159 During
the discussion, one of the alternatives was to include, as a justification for removal,
only one justification concerning the existence of the state as Jewish and demo-
cratic.160 To this proposal, the legal advisor of the Knesset, Eyal Yinon, responded:
If the committee decides to include only this justification for
removal, I fear that a claim would come up that this is a highly
problematic amendment constitutional-wise, which may even be
regarded as an unconstitutional constitutional amendment, that
the Supreme Court has recognized the possibility of its existence
yet has never applied it.
I thus urge the Members of Knesset not to adopt this
idea . . . ,161
a suggestion the Members of Knesset adopted.162 Eventually, inter alia, due to the
system of checks and balances it contains and because it cannot be said that it
157 See id.
158 According to the amendment:
70 Knesset members—10 of whom must be from the opposition—may
file a complaint with the Knesset speaker against any lawmaker who
supports armed struggle against Israel or incites to racial hatred,
kicking off the impeachment process. The Knesset House Committee
would then debate the complaint before clearing it with a three-quarter
majority in the committee. The motion to dismiss the lawmaker would
then be sent to the plenum, where, if 90 of the 120 Knesset members
vote in favor, the MK would be ousted. The deposed lawmaker could
then appeal the decision with the Supreme Court.
Marissa Newman & Toi Staff, Knesset Approves Controversial Law to Remove Lawmakers
from Office, TIMESISR.(July 16, 2016, 1:31 AM), https://www.timesofisrael.com/knesset-ap
proves-bill-to-remove-lawmakers-from-office/ [https://perma.cc/N6H6-UZR9].
159 Protocol N. 129 of the Constitution, Law and Justice Committee, DK, 20th Knesset,
Session No. 2 (2016) (in Hebrew) [hereinafter Protocol N. 129].
160 Id.
161 Id.
162 Ruth Levush, Israel: Constitutionality of Removal from Parliament for Incitement to
Racism or Support for Armed Struggle Against the State, LIBR. CONG. (June 7, 2018), https://
www.loc.gov/law/foreign-news/article/israel-constitutionality-of-removal-from-parliament-for
-incitement-to-racism-or-support-for-armed-struggle-against-the-state/ [https://perma.cc/7P4Z
-4ALY] (discussing the Supreme Court later rejecting challenges to the law’s constitutionality).
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contradicts the core of the state’s democratic identity, a constitutional challenge
against this constitutional amendment was rejected.163 Chief Justice Esther Hayut, who
was joined by eight other judges, wrote that even if we had examined the amendment
according to any of the doctrines accepted in the world regarding limits on constitu-
tional amendments, it appears that this amendment would pass the various stan-
dards.164 Accordingly, it is better to leave the complex question regarding the
applicability of the doctrine in Israeli law undecided for now.165 The legal advice of
Eyal Yinon assisted in removing a highly problematic provision, which “saved” the
amendment from judicial invalidation.166
Italy may provide another example. On October 7, 2009, the Italian Constitutional
Court declared as unconstitutional Law No. 124 of 2008 (“Lodo Alfano,” named
after Minister of Justice, Angelino Alfano), which had established a form of immunity
from criminal prosecution for the highest state’s officials (President of the Republic,
Prime Minister, ministers).167 According to the Constitutional Court, the law was un-
constitutional because it created blanket immunity (in contrast with exceptional
immunity for official conduct) and because it granted greater protection to the Prime
Minister than it did to other ministers.168 The Court also stated that while Parliament
could not enact ordinary legislation governing immunity but had to recourse to a
constitutional amendment.169 Brendan Quigley remarks that, by this decision, “the
Court made an important endorsement of democracy. Regardless of the depth and
scope of Berlusconi’s power, wealth and influence cannot constitutionally place an
individual above the law.”170
As a reaction to this judgment, immediately afterward the government presented
a constitutional bill intended as an integration of the constitutional status of the
“highest office prerogatives.”171 The presentation to the Senate of the bill triggered a
heated discussion that involved both public opinion and public law scholars.172 Among




166 See Protocol N. 129, supra note 159 (describing Yinon’s advice).
167 Brendan Quigley, Immunity, Italian Style: Silvio Berlusconi Versus the Italian Legal
System, 34 HASTINGS INT’L & COMPAR. L. REV. 435, 452, 455 (2011).
168 Id. at 454.
169 Corte cost. [Constitutional Court], 7 ottobre 2009, Judgment No. 262 of 2009 at 2 (It.),
https://www.cortecostituzionale.it/actionPronuncia.do?anno=2009&numero=262&operaz
ione=ricerca [https://perma.cc/QHB8-VKMT]; see Quigley, supra note 167, at 454–55.
170 Quigley, supra note 167, at 460.
171 Draft of Constitutional Law No. 2180, Senato della Repubblica (May 12, 2010), http://
www.senato.it/service/PDF/PDFServer/BGT/00479405.pdf [https://perma.cc/7A3G-BZU7].
172 For public law scholars’ communications in Session No. 203 of June 23, 2010, see
Documenti acquisiti in Commissione, Senato della Repubblica, http://www.senato.it/leg/16
/BGT/Schede/Ddliter/documenti/35399_documenti.htm [https://perma.cc/3DVY-SFRU] (last
visited Dec. 8, 2020) (in Italian).
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one recurrently referred to the constitutional court doctrine about a set of supreme
constitutional principles which cannot be altered, subverted, or amended even by
adopting constitutional amendments or laws because they are inherent to fundamen-
tal constitutional values.173 The idea, in brief, that certain values such as presidential
and minister prerogatives, rights, and liberties vis-à-vis criminal justice are somewhat
part of this nucleus and that only a very careful and detailed discipline of the possible
exceptions to the normal course of criminal law would avoid a future annulment by
the constitutional court.174 This may not necessarily be the only reason, but as a matter
of fact, the “constitutionalised Lodo Alfano” never passed the committee stage, most
probably due to this barrage of criticism and was eventually abandoned.175
These examples demonstrate the ability of judicial review of amendments to pro-
tect democracy even without judicial review. The mere anticipatory effect that judicial
review has is thus important in the protection of democracy.176 Without the “threat”
that the sword of Damocles would drop on the amendment, warning raised by various
actors (including legal advisors) during the legislative process concerning the ques-
tionable constitutionality of a proposed bill would be significantly weakened.177
III. WHO CAN STOP THE D9? TOWARDS AN ANTI-BULLY
THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW
As noted earlier, in a democratic erosion setting, courts are under political pres-
sure.178 David Landau has demonstrated how populist projects of constitutional change
173 The Italian Constitution includes one explicit, unamendable provision protecting the repub-
lican form of government. Art. 139 Costituzione [Cost.] (It.). In one famous judicial decision,
however, the Constitutional Court did not exclude the possibility of also implicit limitation:
The Italian Constitution contains some supreme principles that cannot
be subverted or modified in their essential content, either by laws
amending the Constitution, or by other constitutional laws. These include
both principles that are expressly considered absolute limits on the
power to amend the Constitution, such as the republican form of State
(Art. 139) as well as those principles that, even though not expressly
mentioned among those principles not subject to the procedure of
constitutional amendment, belong to the essence of the supreme values
upon which the Italian Constitution is founded.
Corte cost. [Constitutional Court], 29 dicembre 1988, Giur. it. I 5565, 5569 (It.); see generally
Pietro Faraguna, Unamendability and Constitutional Identity in the Italian Constitutional
Experience, 21 EUR. J.L. REF. 329 (2019).
174 The most contentious part of the bill regarded immunity for criminal offenses unrelated
to the office and even committed before the appointment. See Wendy Zeldin, Italy: Consti-
tutional Court Strikes Down Parts of Immunity Law, LIBR. CONG. (Feb. 11, 2011), https://
www.loc.gov/law/foreign-news/article/italy-constitutional-court-strikes-down-parts-of-immu
nity-law/ [https://perma.cc/PWP6-TDHQ].
175 Quigley, supra note 167, at 450.
176 See Vanberg, supra note 133, at 348.
177 See Tushnet, supra note 134, at 332.
178 See Roznai & Brandes, supra note 117, at 20, 31.
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modify the rules for appointment and jurisdiction of bodies, like constitutional courts,
in an attempt to weaken their independence, pack them, and even capture them.179
Often, courts are threatened in ways that makes it difficult for them to “do their job”
without being worried about possible overrides and political backlashes.180 Schnutz
Rudolf Dürr describes the severe pressures courts endure from state powers:
In a democracy respecting the rule of law, judgments of con-
stitutional courts can be criticized but they have to be executed.
Unfortunately, this is not the case for every constitutional court.
Not only do judgments remain non-implemented, the court’s bud-
get is cut, the procedures of the court are changed to make them
dysfunctional, no new judges are appointed to “starve” the court of
new judges or the court is packed with judges close to the gov-
ernment majority. Some courts are even threatened with outright
abolition and this really happened to a few of them. . . . [A]ll
these methods are being used in practice—and increasingly so.181
Consider the following example. In 2015, reacting to a judicial decision not to his
liking, a Member of Knesset from the Jewish Home Party of the coalition, Motti
Yogev, was interviewed on television and said, “A D9 [bulldozer] shovel should be
used against the High Court. . . . We, as a legislative system, will make sure to rein in
the [judicial rule] in this country, and the tail that wags the dog.”182 Such a reaction is
not unique to politicians in Israel, of course. In the UK, after the abovementioned
Cherry/Miller (No. 2) case, Tory MP Desmond Swayne was interviewed on televi-
sion and, after claiming that the Supreme Court “well overstepped the mark” in its
prorogation judgment, continued to claim that they “should have a commitment to
abolish the Supreme Court.”183 Should judges take into consideration possible political
“backlash” when they adjudicate?
179 David Landau, Populist Constitutions, 85 U. CHI. L. REV. 521, 532 (2018); David
Landau, Abusive Constitutionalism, 47 UC DAVIS L. REV. 189, 189 (2013). For an example
regarding Poland, see SADURSKI, supra note 2, at 58–131; Fryderyk Zoll & Leah Wortham,
Judicial Independence and Accountability: Withstanding Political Stress in Poland, 42
FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 875, 877–79 (2019).
180 See Roznai & Brandes, supra note 117, at 31, 38–39.
181 Schnutz Rudolf Dürr, Constitutional Courts: An Endangered Species?, in LES COURS
CONSTITUTIONNELLES, GARANTIE DE LA QUALITÉ DÉMOCRATIQUE DES SOCIÉTÉS? 111, 112
(Dominique Rousseau ed., 2019).
182 Shimon Cohen, MK Call to “Raze the High Court” Spark Knesset Ire, ARUTZ SHEVA
(July 29, 2015, 3:41 PM), http://www.israelnationalnews.com/News/News.aspx/198784
[https://perma.cc/U9JN-R8AE].
183 ‘This Parliament is a Dead Parliament’: Attorney General Says MPs Have No ‘Moral
Right’ to Be in the Commons, ITV (Sept. 25, 2019, 7:02 PM), https://www.itv.com/news
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Cass Sunstein asked a somewhat similar albeit broader question: “If People
Would Be Outraged by Their Rulings, Should Judges Care?”184 Sunstein then writes
that from a consequential point of view, one may argue that when public outrage
may lead to particularly bad consequences (attacks on the courts may be such
consequences), it may be prudent rather than cowardly for judges to care.185 Epis-
temologically, he adds, under certain conditions, outrage may embody a collective
wisdom superior to the judgment of individual persons, including judges.186 Con-
sequentialism, Andrew Coan replies to Sunstein, is empty without a normative
theory to explain which consequences count as good and bad.187 Coan argues, “Like
consequentialism without a normative account, the epistemic argument is empty
without a theory of interpretation.”188 “If the proper interpretation of the Constitution
depends, in whole or in part, on the public’s views (not as information but as such),
public outrage becomes primary, not secondary evidence of constitutional meaning.”189
This author wishes to leave this more general question aside and focus on a narrower
question concerning the situation where a court in a democracy experiencing demo-
cratic erosion faces political pressure or threat.190 There is no doubt that, just as
legislatures care about judicial invalidation (what this author has called “the sword
of Damocles”), judges worry about possible political “retaliation” to their rulings.191
The literature on judicial behavior usually emphasizes three models: legal, attitudi-
nal, and strategic. Briefly put, the legal model states that justices only consider the law
when deciding cases, and non-legal factors do not play a role in judicial decision-
making. According to the attitudinal model, judges’ decisions are motivated by their
own policy and personal preferences. And according to the strategic model, within
their decision-making process, judges anticipate the reactions of other actors within
the broader institutional context in which they operate.192 Clearly judges, as the
184 For an analysis of judicial anticipation of public outrage and its effects on judicial
independence, see generally Cass R. Sunstein, If People Would Be Outraged by Their Rulings,
Should Judges Care?, 60 STAN. L. REV. 155 (2007).
185 Id. at 170.
186 Id. at 159–61.
187 Andrew B. Coan, Well, Should They?: A Response to If People Would Be Outraged
by Their Rulings, Should Judges Care?, 60 STAN. L. REV. 213, 234 (2007).
188 Id.
189 Id.
190 For a recent excellent collection of essays on democratic breakdown and constitution-
alism under pressure, see CONSTITUTIONALISM UNDER STRESS (Uladzislau Belavusau &
Aleksandra Gliszczynska-Grabias eds., 2020).
191 LAURA LANGER, JUDICIAL REVIEW IN STATE SUPREME COURTS: A COMPARATIVE
STUDY 35 (2002).
192 See generally, e.g., JEFFREY A.SEGAL &HAROL J.SPAETH,THE SUPREME COURT AND THE
ATTITUDINAL MODEL (1993); JEFFREY A. SEGAL & HAROLD J. SPAETH, THE SUPREME
COURT AND THE ATTITUDINAL MODEL REVISITED (2005); LEE EPSTEIN &JACK KNIGHT,THE
CHOICES JUSTICES MAKE (1998); Howard Gillman & Cornell W. Clayton, Beyond Judicial
Attitudes: Institutional Approaches to Supreme Court Decision-Making, in SUPREME COURT
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literature on judicial behavior suggests, consider the attitudes of other actors in a
strategic manner.193 But should—and if so, to what extent—courts consider the political
ramifications of its decisions (the “political backlash”) during judicial review of
laws or of amendments that touch upon sensitive issues but are crucial for the
democratic order? Is it better for them to “go down to the shelter” in order to survive
or perhaps to confront the political branches in order to try and save democracy but
risk a retaliation or even its demise? Or, as Roni Mann puts the question accurately:
“Should a court that responds by toning down its decisions and adopting a strategy
of restraint be praised for its shrewd pragmatism, or should we instead demand that
it bravely stay the course, regardless of retaliatory consequences, even if these might
amount to the demise of the constitutional system?”194
In order to try and analyze these questions, this author uses the analogy of anti-
bullying tactics to evaluate the different models of judicial reactions to political
pressure.195 One of the best ways to deal with bullying is avoiding it. Courts often
have tools of docking petitions,196 but assuming a court cannot avoid the case and
must make a decision, it seems that there are three main possible models.
The first model is confrontation. Researchers from social psychology demon-
strate how this may be the harshest scenario for someone dealing with a bully; it
DECISION-MAKING—NEW INSTITUTIONALIST APPROACHES 1, 1–12 (Cornell W. Clayton &
Howard Gillman eds, 1999). For an overview, see generally Arthur Dyevre, Unifying the
Field of Comparative Judicial Politics: Towards a General Theory of Judicial Behaviour,
2 EUR. POL. SCI. REV. 297 (2010).
193 See Lee Epstein & Jack Knight, Toward a Strategic Revolution in Judicial Politics: A
Look Back, A Look Ahead, 53 POL. RSCH. Q. 625, 626 (2000).
194 Roni Mann, Non-ideal Theory of Constitutional Adjudication, 7 GLOB. CONSTITU-
TIONALISM 14, 19 (2018). Mann argues that “judges should reach a decision about what is
constitutionally—ideally—right, and then calculate how to make it indeed the ‘law of the
land’ with the highest impact.” Id. at 41.
195 Three disclaimers are in place regarding this analogy and for using social psychology
literature for our matter. First, there are many aspects, such as personal welfare, physical and
mental health, self-perception, and mental resilience, as well as individuals’ differences (such as
age, gender, culture, etc.) and the daily emotional stress that are critical in examinations for anti-
bully strategies. These cannot be reflected in any analogy regarding the pressure imposed
upon political and judicial institutions. Second, there are many elements in the relationship
between the judiciary and other branches and the public that are not manifested in the rela-
tionship between a bully and its victim. One such element is trust. The victim can allow
himself to “break the tools” against the bully, and the prospective consequences will not have
broad implications like in the case of a judiciary. Furthermore, theoretically, the bullying victim
can simply escape—leave school or the workplace. This option does not exist for the court.
Third, in interpersonal situations, context and circumstances are dynamic and vary from one to
another. It is thus very difficult to find a uniform recommendation for how to deal with bullying.
196 One may think of doctrines such as ripeness, political question, and deference. For
avoidance tactics, see generally, for example, Alexander M. Bickel, Forward: The Passive
Virtues, 75 HARV. L. REV. 40 (1961); Erin F. Delaney, Analyzing Avoidance: Judicial Strategy
in Comparative Perspective, 66 DUKE L.J. 1 (2016).
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usually makes things worst.197 As bullying researcher Marano says, “[F]ighting back
is the worst defense,” as the bully is usually stronger and bigger.198 It may just escalate
conflict, which the judiciary is most likely to lose.199 As Rosalind Dixon and Samuel
Issacharoff write, “[T]here is no obvious reason to suppose . . . [courts] would
prevail in confronting formidable political power. Lessons abound of courts that
misplayed their hands, sought to thwart a too-powerful executive and were quickly
relegated to irrelevance.”200 How, in Russia, Yeltsin suspended the Constitutional
Court after a highly charged political dispute is just one example.201
The second model is “going down the bunker.” The problem with this approach
is that surrendering to the bully usually does not stop the harassment.202 The bullying
continues and is often aggravated. It is true that in real life, time span matters. The
bully might leave school or the workplace, and life can return to normalcy. Also, in
political life, time matters. In their research, Dixon and Issacharoff demonstrate how
deferral in judicial decision-making can be a useful strategy in the long term:
“Living to fight another day proves to be an attractive option in judging as in all
matters of statecraft.”203 Or, as Erin Delaney puts it:
Delaying a decision on substance might allow the time and space
necessary for productive dialogue with (and within) the political
branches to resolve the question outside of the courts. Delay
may even allow for the evolution of popular consensus on the
issue. The unelected judges on the court may thus be able to
sidestep the difficult question, thereby safeguarding institutional
legitimacy and security.204
This strategy may be useful in normal times. However, the problem with such an ap-
proach in the context of populism and democratic erosion is that if political measures
197 See generally Dieter Zapf & Claudia Gross, Conflict Escalation and Coping with
Workplace Bullying: A Replication and Extension, 10 EUR. J. WORK & ORGANIZATIONAL
PSYCH. 497 (2001).
198 KATHLEEN WINKLER, BULLYING: HOW TO DEAL WITH TAUNTING, TEASING, AND
TORMENTING 77 (2005).
199 See id.
200 Rosalind Dixon & Samuel Issacharoff, Living to Fight Another Day: Judicial Deferral
in Defense of Democracy, 2016 WIS. L. REV. 683, 689.
201 Lee Epstein, Jack Knight & Olga Shvetsova, The Role of Constitutional Courts in the
Establishment and Maintenance of Democratic Systems of Government, 35 L.&SOC’Y.REV.
117, 151–52 (2001).
202 See, e.g., Yonah Jeremy Bob, When Under Pressure, Judges Should Not Back Off from
Doing Their Job, JERUSALEM POST (May 30, 2019, 4:04 AM), https://www.jpost.com/Israel
-News/When-under-pressure-judges-should-not-back-off-from-doing-their-job-591041
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203 Dixon & Issacharoff, supra note 200, at 731.
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to capture democratic institutions are not prevented at the right time, it may simply
be too late to try and stop them at a later stage.205 Democracy has already been
eroded or has even collapsed. As Mattias Kumm recently stated in an interview:
“‘[C]ourts were not successful’ when they tried to ‘become strategic actors and tried
to retrench, back down . . . and go into a [metaphorical] bunker . . . to weather the
storm.’”206 This retrenchment strategy, which some courts have tried, is based on the
hope that “the storm will pass, and then they will be there to resume their proper
function at a later time—this is a widespread tendency.”207 Kumm’s problem with
courts adopting such a passive approach towards power-grabs by other branches is
that in some systems, courts cannot expect to see through the leaders behind the
antidemocratic changes; these rulers may be in power for life.208 Thus, Kumm
“urg[es] courts to resist ‘the illusions they can save the institution by hunkering
down.’”209 This, he suggests, often simply allowed for antidemocratic political
players to “run ragged on the system,” harm, and modify it irreversibly.210
In the short term, “going down the bunker” in difficult times may avoid back-
lash, but it produces bad outcomes which would taint the judiciary’s reputation for
decades to come.211 One can just think of the legacy of Korematsu v. United States
in which the Supreme Court of the United States upheld the constitutionality of a
military order in World War II that initiated the internment of citizens of Japanese
ancestry.212 This decision is often regarded as a useful lesson for “the inability of
courts during wartime to provide any check on political excesses, particularly those
jointly endorsed by the executive and legislature.”213 It is also regarded as a dark
moment in the history of the judiciary and as a “tainted precedent.”214 As Craig Green
writes, “Every American lawyer knows Korematsu v. United States as a discredited
precedent.”215 Thus, for example, the Congressional report “Personal Justice De-
nied” declared that “each part of the decision, questions of both factual review and
legal principles, has been discredited or abandoned.”216
205 Dixon & Issacharoff, supra note 200, at 729–30.
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The third model is business-as-usual. When the bully comes, stand firm. As one
expert of anti-bullying says, “Bullies lose their power if you don’t cower. . . . They
admire you for speaking with self-assurance and confidence. So, when they bombard,
don’t counterpunch. Rather, win them over with your strong, firm, courteous de-
meanor.”217 This is different than the first and second models as it does not ask to
change behavior to a more aggressive or passive one: “Courts are likely to do best
if they simply do their job in a business-as-usual manner. They should not be in-
timidated by the political context,” as Kumm says.218 He further explains:
When under pressure from increasingly aggressive executive
and legislative branches, the judicial branch’s best option is to
stick to its guns and simply do its job as it usually would. . . .
. . . .
[F]or maintaining democracy, it is important that judges
press onward with exercising their authority, even if keeping
their heads down to weather the storm might seem like a more
attractive option.219
A similar approach was recently voiced by Former President of the Israeli Supreme
Court, Professor Aharon Barak, who, in a response to a question on how the court
should act when attacked, said: “The court is attacked, bombarded, however, it must
not say let’s go into the bunker and wait it out in hope of better days. I have no idea
when and if those better days will come . . . . You must stand up tall, and . . . keep
on issuing the same rulings.”220 The benefit of continuing to issue ordinary judicial
rulings, even those that dominant political actors will not like, is that such rulings
may “help motivate forces which can fight.”221 Kumm realizes that “this means
WARTIME RELOCATION AND INTERNMENT OF CIVILIANS 239 (1997). On the legacy of the
case and its influence as a precedent, see generally Dean Masaru Hashimoto, The Legacy of
Korematsu v. United States: A Dangerous Narrative Retold, 4 UCLA ASIAN PAC. AM. L.J.
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[there is] a real danger that the court will be neutralized,” but “if the court doesn’t
try to perform its neutral function, the likelihood of playing a constructive role and
supporting political normalization is lower.”222 And if courts are acting “business-as-
usual” it becomes much more difficult to justify their “neutralization”: “[I]t cannot
be wrong for judges to do what they were put there to do.”223
There is another important argument for not going into the bunker but rather to
exercise judicial authority. While the political branches may retaliate or refuse to
comply with the judicial decision or override it, the court’s ruling destroys the
legitimacy of the measure being taken.224 The business-as-usual action by the court
at the very least denies the “appearance of constitutionality” from the constitutional
and legal measures.225 In a nutshell, the best strategy for courts under such circum-
stances seems to be non-strategic. There is thus certain convergence between acting
strategically and a normative model of judicial behavior according to which judges
are neutral and act strictly according to law. Strategic considerations require that
courts act as though matters are “business-as-usual,” correlating with the normative
approach, which requires judges to consider only legal considerations and deems
strategic considerations as unworthy. Thus, when it comes to protecting the judiciary
the normative approach merges with the strategic approach.
Of course, not all bullies are the same, and their reactions may be different. A
court can traditionally make certain judicial maneuvers it cannot make when facing an
authoritarian government.226 As Verdugo correctly notes, autocrats have more signifi-
cant and effective strategies to “deal with the judiciary” than accountable and elected
politicians and are subject to less political checks than those existing in competitive
democracies. For the autocrats, political backlash against the judiciary is simply less
costly.227 The “business-as-usual” model may only be effective in a certain level of
functioning democracy; it may be less useful or even harmful in a non-democratic
environment. After all, the political power of courts and their ability to protect the
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Most importantly, the ability to successfully face a bully also depends on whether
there are other kids in the playground and what their likely reaction will be. Just as
when facing a bully, the role of third parties is important, and one cannot examine
courts as standing alone.229 Tom Ginsburg has demonstrated how courts around the
world apply various mechanisms to constrain democratic backsliding.230 Nonethe-
less, as he remarks:
[C]ourts are not great heroes here. Their role in saving democracy
is a limited one. The view of the role of courts in this account is
essentially an informational one. Courts operate by providing
high-quality information to publics and elites. But the action
taken to protect democracy from erosion is taken by other actors,
not courts themselves. What judges can do is speak truth to
power, allowing other actors to step up.231
Judicial independence, whether the court enjoys longstanding legitimacy, how
strong and supported civil society or the opposition are, and the stage and state of
democracy in the country may all be relevant factors for the success or failure of the
model.232 “A strong and rapid reaction from the people, from civil society, followed
by others,” Dürr notes, “can sometimes avoid problems from developing further.”233
What is normatively argued is that courts should take a reasonably “assertive”
role in maintaining democratic integrity.234 András Jakab argues that “constitutional
courts should demonstrate activism when protecting democratic and rule-of-law
mechanisms.”235 This author is not sure courts should be especially activist. They
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should act as they would normally act without such political pressure. True, courts
cannot save democracy on their own. But when they exercise their full authority to
protect democracy, at the very least they do the best they can to save it.236 As Samuel
Issacharoff states, “The era of rising populist anger and the dysfunction of modern
democracies is hopefully transitory. For as long as these moments last, however,
there is greater pressure for judicial engagement with the institutional foundations
of democratic governance.”237
In exercising this role, courts’ authority to review amendments is important for
two main reasons. First, because a central mechanism in the process of democratic ero-
sion is formal constitutional amendments, the doctrine of “unconstitutional constitu-
tional amendments,” which sets various limits on formal constitutional change, may
function as a useful tool to block or hinder such attempts at harming democracy.238
Second, and more importantly as for the more general role of courts, when courts
possess the power to review even constitutional amendments, the worry against
possible political “retaliation” is relaxed because the court can take a more “sincere”
approach to constitutional adjudication.239 It provides the court the freedom to
primarily decide cases according to its own policy preferences rather than search for
second-best solutions that consider possible overrides and backlashes.240 It releases
the court from strategic calculations and allows it to focus more on the normative
force of principled constitutional reasoning.241
CONCLUSION
As I have argued in this Article, courts have an important role, through judicial
review and its anticipatory effect, in protecting democracy.242 Democracy, in the sub-
stantive sense, is a system of government that includes not only majoritarian pro-
cesses of decision-making but also a core of fundamental rights, rule of law, and
separation of powers. Nevertheless, around the world, democracy is under stress, a
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phenomenon that raises difficult questions for the role of courts as they face political
pressure. When under pressure, courts should neither retaliate nor go under the bunker
to weather the storm.243 They should act “business-as-usual” and continue with their
role without being overly strategic.244 The bunker approach, just like facing a bully,
is doomed to fail. When the judiciary has the authority to review constitutional
amendments, and not just ordinary legislation, the court has less to worry about with
regard to possible overrides and backlashes.245
With that said, courts are limited organs, and judicial decisions have less power
and influence than we—constitutional scholars—often like to believe.246 In 1892,
James Thayer wrote that “[u]nder no system can the power of courts go far to save
a people from ruin; our chief protection lies elsewhere.”247 This statement invites a
cautionary note in conclusion. The court has neither “the sword nor the purse,” to
use Hamilton’s famous words.248 All it has is its legitimacy.249 Eventually, it comes
down to the people themselves, the society, its culture, and its education.250 As
András Jakab recently claimed, constitutional norms cannot be considered detached
from their particular social and political context.251 Only within such context can one
understand how constitutional norms can support democracy and the rule of law.
And when democratic erosion occurs, the normativity of constitutional law is
failing; a failure that expands the gap between the constitution and constitutional
reality.252 Liora Lazarus rightly notes:
The fight to stem the tide of authoritarianism depends on
establishing a defence of the rule of law which has real purchase
on the public imagination. This narrative must be capable of
persuading the broader public of the essential value of constitu-
tionalism. If we fail to establish this counter-narrative, liberal
democracy as a whole is threatened.253
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The judiciary has an important supporting role in that respect. The legal debate
brings with it a public debate, and it is a hindering machinery that allows the people,
the politicians, and the civil society to reconsider constitutional and legal changes and,
if needed, to object to them.254 And through its judgments, the court can also explain
and educate about the possible problems a specific legislation or an amendment
poses to democracy.255 By so doing, it removes the façade of constitutionality from
certain actions or reforms that may harm democracy.256 True, the power of the
court—like any legal instrument—is limited. This does not mean that it should be
emptied of power. Courts have an important role in hindering certain processes, but
they alone cannot save democracy. In the end, “[C]onstitutions cannot save democracy:
only (small d) democrats can.”257 The same is true with courts and the protection of
democracy. Courts, however, may assist small d democrats to save democracy.
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